punishment upon return to his/her country of origin. The decision of the court of first instance is subject to appeal (and further appeal to the Supreme Court, if leave to appeal has been granted). Pursuant to chapter 7, section 16 of the Aliens Act, the Government may revoke, partly or entirely, a judgement or order for expulsion on account of a criminal offence and grant a temporary residence or work permit, based on circumstances that did not exist at the time of the expulsion order. 4.3The State party submits that the complainant did not exhaust domestic remedies because he did not appeal the judgement of the District Court of 17 March 2000. Rather, he declared his satisfaction with the judgement, regarding both his prison term and the expulsion order, one day prior to the deadline for lodging an appeal; he thus expressly waived his right to appeal. 4.4By reference to a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in a similar case,b the State party argues that an appeal to the Court of Appeal (as well as a potential further appeal to the Supreme Court), would have been an effective and reasonably expeditious remedy, which cannot be replaced by the extraordinary remedy under chapter 7, section 16 of the Aliens Act. The complainant did not show that his alleged risk of being tortured and sentenced to death upon return to Iran could not have been raised in the criminal appellate, rather than extraordinary, proceedings. 4.5The State party argues that, in any event, the complainant failed to substantiate his alleged risk of torture upon return to Iran, for purposes of admissibility. It concludes that the communication is manifestly unfounded and therefore inadmissible under article 22 of the Convention, as well as rule 107 (b) of the Committee’s revised rules of procedure.c Complainant’s comments on the State party’s submissions 5.1On 29 June 2003, the complainant, in his comments on the State party’s observations, submits that he did not appeal the judgement of the District Court, because the State prosecutor had warned him that, in such case, he would appeal the verdict acquitting the complainant’s wife, who initially had also been charged with drug offences, and that there was a high risk of her not being acquitted on appeal. Since the complainant did not want to risk the future of his wife and children, he felt compelled to waive his right to lodge an appeal, which in any event was not likely to succeed. 5.2The complainant reiterates his arguments about the personal risks that he would run, and the general human rights situation in Iran. He argues that the State party would not be able to guarantee his safety if he were to be returned to that country. Additional submission by State party and complainant’s further comments 6.1On 23 September 2003, the State party rejects as unsubstantiated the complainant’s allegation regarding the circumstances under which he waived his right to appeal the judgement of the District Court of Norrköping, and reiterates that the communication is inadmissible, under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention, for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and, in any event, under article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention, as being manifestly unfounded. 6.2The State party submits a translation of a statement by the State prosecutor in the complainant’s case, to the effect that he never discussed his intention in relation to a possible appeal against the judgement of the District Court with the complainant, given that: (a) the complainant did not speak Swedish; (b) he never contacted defence counsel to reveal his intentions with regard to a possible appeal; (c) although he cannot rule out that counsel for the complainant contacted him to find out whether he would consider appealing independently, he does not remember any such contact; (d) he was content with the judgement and expulsion order against the complainant and, upon reflection, decided not to appeal the acquittal of the complainant’s wife; and (e) it would have been impossible for him to appeal the acquittal of the complainant’s wife, if the complainant had waited until the last day of the three-week period for lodging an appeal against the sentence and expulsion, as no additional week was available to the prosecution to file a cross-appeal in cases of acquittal. 7.In a submission of 9 October 2003, the complainant reiterates his argument in paragraph 5.1 above and submits that it was probably his lawyer who informed him of the prosecutor’s intention to appeal his wife’s acquittal if he appealed his sentence. Although his lawyer did not remember whether he had contacted the prosecutor on the issue, the prosecutor himself had not excluded that possibility in his statement to the Committee. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 8.1Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee against Torture must decide whether or not it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. The Committee has ascertained, as it is required to do under article 22, paragraph 5 (a), of the Convention, that the same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 8.2The Committee has noted the State party’s objection that the communication is inadmissible under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention, as the complainant failed to exhaust domestic remedies. It has also taken note of the explanation provided by the complainant, and challenged by the State party, that his failure to appeal his sentence was explained by the fact that the prosecutor had warned him that he would appeal his wife’s acquittal, should he, the complainant, appeal against his sentence and the expulsion order of the District Court. 8.3However, the Committee need not pronounce itself on whether the complainant was required to exhaust domestic remedies in the circumstances of the case, as his claim that he would be at a risk of being subjected to torture upon return to Iran because of his employment with the army of the Shah prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979 is pure speculation and fails to rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of admissibility, in the absence of any corroborating evidence. The Committee thus concludes, in accordance with article 22 of the Convention and rule 107 (b) of its revised rules of procedure, that the communication is manifestly unfoundedd and thus inadmissible.