As a result of the proceedings, the Chancellor found that the petitioner’s children had been ensured with beds in conformity with the requirements of the legislation during their stay in the shelter. In the course of the inspection visit, the Chancellor’s advisers also examined the life and conditions in the shelter in general and talked to carers and two of the older children. During the conversations no complaints about the living conditions were made and the advisers also did not notice any other shortcomings with regard to the care and living conditions of the children. 2. Restriction of the rights of parents in a custodial institution and their children During the reporting year, on several occasions the Chancellor analysed the conformity of the restriction of the rights of parents in a custodial institution and their children with the principle of guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, in a case where Tartu City Government separated a child only for the reason that the child’s parent with the right of custody was staying in a custodial institution, the Chancellor found that Tartu City Government had made a significant error of discretion. The city government separated the child from the family because due to the arrest and stay in a custodial institution the parent with the right of custody could no longer take care of the child. The city government separated the child for this reason regardless of the fact that the parent with the right of custody had given the child to the care of a foster family before going to the custodial institution. The Chancellor found that the judgment of discretion by Tartu City Government did not conform to § 135(4) of the Family Law Act under which separation of a child from the family by a local authority may only be based on a threat to the child’s health or life. In the opinion of the Chancellor, Tartu City Government made a significant error of discretion when separating the petitioner’s child from the family. On this basis, the Chancellor recommended to the City Government to comply with the requirements of the law when deciding separation of children from the family in the future. In this case it is also worth pointing out the Chancellor’s conclusion that in separating a child from the foster family the local authority should apply the same provision as in separating a child from the biological family, i.e. § 135(4) of the Family Law Act under which a child may be separated from the foster family only if the local authority believes that the child’s health or life is endangered. In the same case, the issue of restriction of visiting rights of close relatives in respect of the child arose. The Chancellor drew the attention of the city government to the fact that the legal basis for restricting the visiting rights depends on whether the parent’s right of custody has been preserved or not. In this case, the petitioner’s right of custody had been fully preserved and thus the petitioner could decide which third parties were allowed access to the child. If in such a situation the city government had considered it necessary to restrict contacts between the child and the child’s next of kin, it should have had recourse to the court (§ 143(3) of the Family Law Act) for restriction/deprivation of the parent’s right of decision with regard to the issue of access of third parties to the child. Further, the Chancellor explained that in organising communication between the child and the child’s close relatives, the local authority must proceed from § 28 of the Child Protection Act under which a child who is separated from one or both parents has the 51