CAT/C/39/D/304/2006 Page 10 6.5 The Committee also recalls its case law10 to the effect that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires petitioners to use remedies that are directly related to the risk of torture in the country to which they would be sent, not those that might allow them to remain where they are. 6.6 Secondly, the Committee notes that the complainants have not explained why they did not consider it necessary to ask the Federal Court for leave to apply for judicial review of the negative PRRA decision. The Committee recalls that it has previously found that these remedies are not mere formalities, and the Federal Court may, in appropriate cases, look at the substance of a case.11 In the present case the complainants have not in fact challenged the effectiveness of this remedy and have not argued that exhaustion of the final remedy would take an unreasonable length of time. The Committee also notes that, even though the complainants believe that the correct version of the complainant’s partner’s death certificate is a “crucial” piece of evidence in their case, they nevertheless did not bring it to the attention of the judicial authorities. Under the circumstances, the Committee is of the view that the conditions of article 22, paragraph 5 (b), have not been met in this case and that the communication is therefore inadmissible. 6.7 The Committee consequently decides: (a) That the communication is inadmissible; (b) That this decision shall be communicated to the authors of the communication and to the State party. [Adopted in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the French text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued also in Arabic and Chinese as part of the Committee’s annual report to the General Assembly.] ----- 10 Communication No. 170/2000, Anup Roy v. Sweden, decision of 23 November 2001, para. 7.1. 11 T.A. v. Canada, communication No. 273/2005, decision of 15 May 2006, para. 6.3.