CAT/C/59/D/644/2014 7.4 The Committee notes the State party’s challenge to the admissibility of the complaint on the ground that the complainant’s claims under article 3 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded. The Committee considers, however, that the inadmissibility argument adduced by the State party is linked to the merits and should thus be considered at that stage. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the present complaint admissible. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, the Committee has considered the complaint in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant and her three minor daughters to Nigeria would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant and her daughters would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Nigeria. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a foreseeable, real and personal risk.9 Although, under the terms of its general comment No. 1, the Committee is free to assess the facts on the basis of the full set of circumstances in every case, considerable weight is given to the findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned (para. 9).10 8.5 The Committee takes note of the complainant’s allegations that, if deported to Nigeria, her minor daughters would be subjected to female genital mutilation on the instructions of her ex-husband, her ex-mother-in-law or her own relatives. She claims that, following a family visit to Nigeria in 2010, her then mother-in-law and husband insisted that the daughters should undergo female genital mutilation; that to protect her daughters she moved from Italy, where she used to live with her husband, to Sweden in 2012; that despite the ban on female genital mutilation in Edo State, this practice continues; and that women from her and her ex-husband’s ethnic groups are allegedly mutilated in Nigeria. She also claims that they would not be able to escape to other parts of the country and establish 9 10 8 See also A.R. v. Netherlands, para. 7.3. See, inter alia, complaint No. 356/2008, N.S. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 6 May 2010, para. 7.3.