4.2 As to the admissibility of the claims made under article 7, the State party argues that most of the claims are inadmissible. In respect of the first claim that the prolonged detention violated article 7, the State party considers that the claim is unsubstantiated, that it is beyond the scope of article 7, and that domestic remedies have not been exhausted. The author has not advanced any evidence of acts or practices by the State party rising beyond the mere condition of detention that would have rendered his detention particularly harsh or reprehensible. The only evidence submitted is that the author developed paranoid schizophrenia while in detention, whereas no evidence is submitted that his mental illness was caused by being subjected to any maltreatment of the type prohibited by article 7. Secondly, as the complaint is, in truth, an attack on the author’s detention per se rather than on a reprehensible treatment or aspect of detention, it falls outside the scope of article 7 as previously determined by the Committee. Thirdly, the State party considers that the author has not exhausted domestic remedies. He could either file a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), which tables reports in Parliament, or to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, who could recommend remedies, including compensation. both a single judge, and on appeal, a Full Court, of the Federal Court. At no stage during his initial or subsequent detention did the author seek habeas corpus or invoke the High Court’s original jurisdiction to seek a writ of mandamus or other remedy. The State party recalls that mere doubts about the effectiveness of remedies does not relieve the claimant from the requirement to pursue them.27 The State party also argues that the author’s claim is simply an allegation that there was no way that he could apply to be released from detention, either administratively or by a court. He has not advanced any evidence of how article 9, paragraph 4, had been violated, and, as stated above, he did in fact challenge the lawfulness of his detention on several occasions. The claim is accordingly unsubstantiated. 4.5 As to the merits of the claims, the State party considers all of them to be unfounded. 4.6 As to the first portion of the claim under article 7 (related to the author’s detention), the State party notes that, while the Committee has not drawn sharp distinctions between the elements of article 7, it has nevertheless drawn broad categories. It observes that torture relates to deliberate treatment intended to cause suffering of a particularly high intensity and cruelty for a certain purpose.28 Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment refers to acts (primarily in detention) which must attain a minimum level of severity, but which do not constitute torture.29 “Degrading” treatment or 4.3 In respect of that part of the second portion of the claim under article 7 that invokes the State party’s responsibility for a subsequent violation in Iran of the author’s rights under article 9, the State party argues that this falls outside the scope of article 7. The State party contends that the prohibition on refoulement under article 7 is limited to risks of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition does not extend to violations of article 9 as detention per se is not a violation of article 7.25 Further the Committee has never stated that article 9 has a comparable nonrefoulement obligation attached to it. The State party interprets ARJ v. Australia26 for the proposition that due process guarantees are not within the ambit of the prohibition on non-refoulement, and argues that by analogy, neither would potential violations of article 9. 27 McGoldrick, G. (1991), The Human Rights Committee: Its role in the development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford; Nowak M. (1993), United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, Engel, Kehl. Thus, acts previously found by the Committee to constitute torture include systematic beatings, electro-shocks, submersion in a mixture of water, blood and human waste, burns, and simulated executions or amputations. (Grille Motta v. Uruguay No. 11/1977; Burgos v. Uruguay No. 52/1979; Sendic v. Uruguay No. 63/1979; Angel Estrella v. Uruguay No. 74/1980; Herrera Rubio v. Colombia No. 161/1983; and Lafuente v. Bolivia No. 176/1984.) 4.4 As to the admissibility of the claims made under article 9, the State party does not contest the admissibility of the claim made under article 9, paragraph 1, but considers the claim under article 9, paragraph 4, inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and want of substantiation. The State party contends that the author’s initial period of detention was considered and declared lawful by 25 Vuolanne v. Finland, No. 265/1987. 26 Op. cit. N.S. v. Canada, No. 29/1978. 28 29 Violations have been found in the following categories of situations: direct assaults on persons, harsh conditions of detention, imposition of extended solitary confinement and inadequate medical and psychiatric treatment for detainees, with examples being administering severe corporal punishments (amputation, castration, sterilization, blinding and so forth), systematic beatings, electro shocks, burns, extended hanging from hand and/or leg chains, standing for great lengths of time, threats, detaining people bound and blindfolded, subjecting detainees to cold, giving detainees little to eat, detaining people incommunicado, as well as aggravated forms of carrying out a death sentence. See Carballal v. 146