Communication No. 1019/2001 Submitted by: Mercedes Carrión Barcáiztegui (represented by Carlos Texidor Nachón and José Luis Mazón Costa) Alleged victim: The authors State party: Spain Declared inadmissible: 30 March 2004 (eightieth session) Subject matter: Alleged discrimination in succession to hereditary title of nobility was the younger sister of Concepción Barcáiztegui y Uhagón and the older sister of Íñigo Barcáiztegui Uhagón. The author also claims that renunciation of the title in favour of her uncle supposes a modification of the line of succession to the noble title and a contravention of the inalienable nature of titles of nobility. Procedural Issues: Examination of "same matter" Exhaustion of domestic remedies Incompatibility ratione materiae Substantive Issues: Discrimination on ground of sex - Equality before the law 2.3 In response, counsel for the defendants cited, among other arguments, the fact that regardless of the validity of the transfer, the principle of male succession remained the preferential criterion for succession to the Marquisate of Tabalosos, which was governed not by a general norm, but by a specific act, at the royal prerogative, which did not constitute part of the legal order. Articles of the Covenant: 3; 17 and 26 Article of the Optional Protocol: 3 1. The author of the communication, dated 8 March 2001, is Mercedes Carrión Barcáiztegui, a Spanish national, who claims to be a victim of violations by Spain of articles 3, 17 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. She is represented by counsel. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant entered into force for Spain on 25 January 1985. 2.4 In a judgement of 25 November 1998, the Madrid Court of First Instance dismissed the author’s action, finding that the suit concerned a situation involving collateral relatives of the last holder of the title; the court abided by the judgement of the Constitutional Court of 3 July 1997,3 which declared the historical preferential criteria for the transmission of titles of nobility to be constitutional. These criteria are: firstly, the degree of kinship; next, sex - precedence of male descendants over female; and, thirdly, age. With regard to transfer of the title, the Madrid court determined that it did not represent a modification of the order of succession to titles of nobility. The facts as submitted by the author 2.1 Ms. María de la Concepción Barcáiztegui Uhagón1 - the author’s aunt - held the title of Marquise of Tabalosos. By a notarized deed of 20 June 1989, she provided that on her death, her brother Íñigo Barcáiztegui Uhagón should succeed her as holder of the title. She died on 4 April 1993 without issue. 2.5 The author claims that she has exhausted all remedies, since by virtue of the judgement of the Constitutional Court of 3 July 1997 no remedy is available to her.4 However, on 10 December 1998, she appealed before the National High Court. In her communication she states that despite the manifest 2.2 In February 1994 the author initiated a legal action against her uncle, Íñigo Barcáiztegui Uhagón, and her cousin, Javier Barcáiztegui Rezola, claiming the noble title of Marquis of Tabalosos.2 The author claimed the greater right, since she occupied by representation the place of her mother, Mercedes Barcáiztegui - deceased on 7 September 1990 - who 3 This judgement prompted the Supreme Court to modify its jurisprudence, which had departed from historical precedent with regard to equality of men and women. 1 Concepción Barcáiztegui Uhagón was the firstborn daughter of José Barcaíztegui y Manso, the third Marquis of Tabalosos. María Mercedes Barcáiztegui Uhagón, the author’s mother, was his second daughter and Íñigo Barcáiztegui Uhagón’s elder sister. According to the author, Íñigo conceded the title to his son, Javier Barcáiztegui Rezola. 4 Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Constitutional Court Organization Act provides that “judgements for dismissal of appeals on matters of constitutionality and in disputes in defence of local autonomy may not be the subject of any subsequent appeal on the issue by either of these two means based on the same violation of the same constitutional precept”. 2 The author relates that she asked her cousin why her uncle had conceded the title to him. 27