a request to submit a "supervisory protest" or a cassation motion does not constitute a review within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant because the submission of a "supervisory protest" or cassation motion is an exceptional right, depending on the discretion of those authorities and is not a duty. 5.8 With regard to the violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (g), the author reiterates that he confessed during the preliminary investigation because he was misled by the investigator and because he had been the victim of violence during investigation. In support of this claim, the author refers to a letter written by the co-defendant to the author's parents, testimonies of Mr. Saulius Peldzius who was in custody with the author, and audiorecords of conversation between the author and the investigator. Moreover, the author states that he made a complaint against the investigator to the General Prosecutor of Lithuania on 15 and 30 May 1996 and that the General Prosecutor decided on 12 June 1996 not to investigate. 5.3 The possibility to submit a cassation motion in accordance with the requirement of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant exists only since 1 January 1995. 5.4 With regard to the term of one year to submit a cassation motion, that was allegedly overlapped in the present case, the author claims that the one-year time limit of article 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could only be applicable to cassation motions which aim to worsen the situation of a convicted person. According to this provision, "it is permitted to lodge a cassation complaint about a sentence for applying the law that provides for more major crime [...] or for other aims, which worsen the situation of a convicted person [...]".3 The applications for cassation motion of 28 September 1995 and 2 April 1996 were made with the purpose to acquit the author, thus to improve his situation. The requests were thus regular and the time limit of one year could not apply. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 6.2 The Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement for purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. 5.5 The author, pointing to an apparent contradiction between the State party's argumentation and the content of the letters rejecting the cassation motion, further explains that the decision of 8 December 1995 rejecting the application for a cassation motion was not based on the fact that it exceeded the one-year time limit, but because "the motives of your cassation complaint [...] are denied by evidence, which were examined in court and considered in the sentence". 6.3 With regard to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 1 and 3 (g), the Committee notes the author's claims that the judgement of the Supreme Court of 4 May 1994 does not reflect the merits of the case and that, during the investigation, he was forced to confess to the murder for which he was later convicted. In this respect, the Committee has taken note of the undated statement made by the author's co-defendant as well as the testimony given on 15 June 1995 by a cellmate, Saulius Peldzius. 5.6 On the second application for a cassation motion of 2 April 1996, the Chairman of the Supreme Court wrote on 5 April 1996 that the law does not provide that the Supreme Court "is a cassation instance for [sentences that have] been adopted by itself". It added that sentences of the Supreme Court "are final and [cannot be appealed, so that retrying] the case is impossible". The Chairman of the Supreme Court did not refer to the one-year time limit. The claim under article 14, paragraph 5, is thus sufficiently substantiated. 6.4 Recalling that it is in general for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts in a particular case, the Committee notes that these allegations were raised during the trial and addressed by the Supreme Court in its judgement. Moreover, the information before the Committee and the arguments advanced by the author do not show that the Courts' evaluation of the facts was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. The Committee is thus of the opinion that the author has not substantiated his claim under article 14, paragraph 1 and 3 (g), of the Covenant and that this claim is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 5.7 With regard to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 1, the author reiterates that the principles of criminal procedure were not complied with and that the conclusions of the Court do not therefore follow the merits of the case. 3 6.5 With regard to the alleged violation of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, the Committee notes the State party's contention that this part of the As translated by the author. 104