demonstrated, in the present case, that the ban on dwarf tossing as practised by the author did not constitute an abusive measure but was necessary in order to protect public order, which brings into play considerations of human dignity that are compatible with the objectives of the Covenant. The Committee accordingly concludes that the differentiation between the author and the persons to whom the ban ordered by the State party does not apply was based on objective and reasonable grounds. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Human Rights Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information provided by the parties, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee must decide whether the authorities’ ban on dwarf tossing constitutes discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant, as the author asserts. 7.5 The Committee is aware of the fact that there are other activities which are not banned but which might possibly be banned on the basis of grounds similar to those which justify the ban on dwarf tossing. However, the Committee is of the opinion that, given that the ban on dwarf tossing is based on objective and reasonable criteria and the author has not established that this measure was discriminatory in purpose, the mere fact that there may be other activities liable to be banned is not in itself sufficient to confer a discriminatory character on the ban on dwarf tossing. For these reasons, the Committee considers that, in ordering the above-mentioned ban, the State party has not, in the present case, violated the rights of the author as contained in article 26 of the Covenant. 7.3 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence whereby not every differentiation of treatment of persons will necessarily constitute discrimination, which is prohibited under article 26 of the Covenant. Differentiation constitutes discrimination when it is not based on objective and reasonable grounds. The question, in the present case, is whether the differentiation between the persons covered by the ban ordered by the State party and persons to whom this ban does not apply may be validly justified. 7.4 The ban on throwing ordered by the State party in the present case applies only to dwarves (see paragraph 2.1). However, if these persons are covered to the exclusion of others, the reason is that they are the only persons capable of being thrown. Thus, the differentiation between the persons covered by the ban, namely dwarves, and those to whom it does not apply, namely persons not suffering from dwarfism, is based on an objective reason and is not discriminatory in its purpose. The Committee considers that the State party has 7.6 The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts before it do not reveal any violation of the Covenant. Communication No. 868/1999 Submitted by: Albert Wilson (represented by Gabriela Echeverria) Alleged victim: The author State party: Philippines Date of adoption of Views: 30 October 2003 (Seventy-ninth session) Articles of the Covenant: 2, paragraphs 2 and 3; 6; 7; 9; 10, paragraphs 1 and 2; 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 Subject matter: Imposition of death sentence following conviction of child abuse Procedural issues: Available and effective remedies - Examination of a complaint after a remedy has been granted to the victim - Nonsubstantiation of claim - Inadmissibility ratione materiae Finding: Violation (articles 7; 9, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and 10, paragraphs 1 and 2) Substantive issues: Mandatory imposition of death penalty - Right to be treated with humanity and with respect for prisoner’s inherent dignity - Inhuman conditions of detention Segregation of pre-trial and convicted prisoners - Mental stress on death row - Right to be informed, at the time of arrest, of reasons of arrest and charges - Right to be brought promptly before a judge 1. The author of the communication, dated 15 June 1999, is Albert Wilson, a British national resident in the Philippines from 1990 until 2000 and thereafter in the United Kingdom. He claims to be a victim of violations by the Philippines of articles 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6. He is represented by counsel. Articles of the Optional Protocol: 2 and 3 114