Johnson v. Jamaica,3 that as the imposition of the death sentence was in violation of the Covenant, his resulting detention, particularly in the light of the treatment and conditions suffered, was cruel and inhuman punishment, contrary to article 7. violation of article 10, paragraph 2, in that he was not separated from convicted prisoners. 5.7 The author argues that there is no obligation to report or complain about conditions of detention when to do so would foreseeably result in victimization.5 The author provides copies of three letters he did write to the Philippine Commission on Human Rights in 1997, which resulted in him being beaten up and locked in his cell for several days. In 1999, while on death row, the Department of Justice was alerted of threats to the author’s life and asked to take steps to protect him. The response was a serious threat to his life, with a gun being placed against his head by a guard (when he had already seen another inmate shot). The author submits that the State party’s inability to respond to these claims in their submissions only underlines the lack of an effective domestic ‘machinery of control’ and the need for investigation and compensation for the violations of article 7 he suffered. 5.4 The author argues generally, with reference to the Committee’s General Comment on article 6, that the re-imposition of the death penalty in a State party is contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant and violates article 6, paragraphs 1 to 3. In any event, the manner in which the Philippines has reintroduced the death penalty violates article 6, paragraph 2, as well as the obligation contained in article 2, paragraph 2, to give effect to Covenant rights. The Republic Act 7659, providing for the death sentence for 46 offences (of which 23 mandatorily), is flawed and affords no protection of Covenant rights. 5.5 At the time of the author’s trial, the applicable criminal procedure required a rape charge to be brought by the victim or her parents or guardian, who have not expressly pardoned the offender. The author argues that to provide for a mandatory death penalty for an offence which cannot even be prosecuted ex officio by the State is a standing invitation for extortion – fabricating an allegation and seeking money for an express pardon. The author repeatedly asserted at trial that the claimant had sought US$25,000 in exchange for an “affidavit of desistance”. The author’s suffering is a direct result of the State’s failure to guarantee the most strict legal procedures and safeguards in capital cases generally, and, in particular, in his case. 5.8 As to the conditions of detention on death row, it is submitted that they caused serious additional detriment to the author’s mental health and constituted a separate violation of article 7. The author suffered extreme anxiety and severe suffering as a result of the detention, with a General Psychiatric Assessment finding the author “very depressed and suffering from severe longstanding [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] that can lead to severe and sudden self-destructive behaviour”. The author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence that while in principle mental strain following conviction does not violate article 7, “the situation could be different in cases involving capital punishment”6 and that “each case must be considered on its own merits, bearing in mind the imputability … on the State party, the specific conditions of imprisonment in the particular penitentiary and their psychological impact on the person concerned”.7 5.6 As to the descriptions of conditions of detention suffered before conviction in Valenzuela jail, the author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence which has consistently found similar treatment inhumane and in violation of articles 7 and 10.4 The conditions in Valenzuela are welldocumented in reports of Amnesty International and media sources, and plainly fall beneath what the Covenant requires of all States parties, regardless of their budgetary situation. He also advances a specific 5.9 In this case, the author’s conviction and the conditions of detention fell well below minimum standards and were plainly imputable to the State party. In addition, death row inmates on appeal were not separated from those whose convictions had become final. During the author’s detention, six prisoners were executed (three convicted of rape). In one case, a communications failure prevented a presidential reprieve from stopping an execution. In another, three prisoners were executed despite the Human Rights Committee’s request for interim 3 Case No. 592/1994, Views adopted on 20 October 1998. 4 The author refers, by way of example, to Carballal v. Uruguay, Case No. 33/1978, Views adopted on 27 March 1981; Massiotti v. Uruguay, Case No. 25/1978, Views adopted on 26 July 1982; Marais v. Madagascar, Case No. 115/1982, Views adopted on 1 April 1985; Antonaccio v. Uruguay, Case No. 63/1979, Views adopted on 28 October 1971; Estrella v. Uruguay, Case No. 74/1989, Views adopted on 29 March 1983; Wight v. Madagascar, Case No. 115/1981, Views adopted on 1 April 1985; and Tshisekedi v. Zaire, Case No. 242/1987, Views adopted on 2 November 1989. 5 The author refers to Philip v. Jamaica Case No. 594/1992, Views adopted on 20 October 1998. 6 Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, Case Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987, Views adopted on 6 April 1989. 7 Francis v. Jamaica, Case No. 606/1994, Views adopted on 25 July 1995. 118