2.6 On 30 August 1995, the newly elected Ontario government exercised its right to terminate the CHCAs, wishing “to act in a manner consistent with” the Supreme Court’s decision in the author’s case. Sweden,4 the author argues that, far from being “necessary for the continued visibility and welfare of the minority as a whole”, the restrictions in question imperil the very cultural and spiritual survival of the minority. 2.7 In September 1995, the First Nations affected by the termination sought interim and permanent injunctions against the Ontario government. The Ontario Court of Justice rejected the claims, holding that the government had properly exercised its right, under the agreements, to terminate them with notice of 30 days. The author contends that the Court made it “very clear” that the outcome of further proceedings would go against the applicants, and that it was therefore pointless to pursue further costly remedies. 3.3 The author contends that the unilateral abrogation of the CHCAs violates article 27 of the Covenant. The author submits that article 27 imposes “an obligation to restore fundamental rights on which cultural and spiritual survival of a First Nations depends, to a sufficient degree to ensure the survival and the development of the First Nation’s culture through the survival and development of the rights of its individual members”. Although providing some relief, the contractual nature of the CHCAs, and the facility for unilateral termination, failed to provide adequate measures of protection for the author and the precarious culture of the minority of which he is a member. 2.8 On 16 January 1997, the Supreme Court rejected the author’s motion for a rehearing of his case. The author had argued that developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to the effect that a clear intent to extinguish fishing rights had to accompany a surrender of interest in land in order to be valid3 warranted a re-examination of his case. 3.4 The author also alleges violations of article 27 and article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant in that the federal and provincial governments are only prepared to consider monetary compensation for loss of the aboriginal rights, rather than restore the rights themselves. Payment of money is not an appropriate “positive measure” of protection, deemed to be required by article 2, paragraph 2. The complaint 3.1 The author complains generally that he and all other members of his First Nation are being deprived of the ability to exercise their aboriginal fishing rights individually and in community with each other and that this threatens their cultural, spiritual and social survival. He contends that hunting, fishing, gathering and trapping are essential components of his culture, and that denial of the ability to exercise it imperils transmission of the culture to other persons and to later generations. 3.5 The author adds that his claim as described above should be interpreted in the light of article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, as the status of First Nations as “peoples” has been recognized at the domestic level. He contends that article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant precludes the State party from contending that First Nations do not, in international law, have such status, for it has been conferred on them by domestic law. 3.2 Specifically, the author considers that the Supreme Court judgement in his case is incompatible with article 27 of the Covenant. Referring to the Committee’s General Comment 23, he argues that the federal government of Canada failed in its duty to take positive measures of protection by not intervening in his favour in the judicial proceedings. Neither the Covenant nor other applicable international law were referred to or considered in the proceedings. The decision, moreover, has resulted in the denial of essential elements of culture, spiritual welfare, health, social survival and development, and education of children. The author argues that the Williams Treaties are the only treaties that fail to protect indigenous hunting and fishing rights, but instead aim at explicitly extinguishing them, and that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case is an anomaly in its case law. Referring to the Committee’s decision in Kitok v. 3 3.6 As a consequence of the above, the author requests the Committee to urge the State party to take effective steps to implement the appropriate measures to recognize and ensure the exercise of their hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering rights, through a new treaty process. 3.7 The author states that the same matter has not been submitted for examination under any other procedure of international investigation or settlement. Videotape submission by the author 4. In his original communication of 9 October 1998, the author, referring to the oral tradition of the Mississauga First Nations, requested the Committee to take into account, in addition to written materials submitted by the parties, oral evidence reproduced in 4 R v. Adams [1996] 3 SCR 101 (SCC). 127 Case No. 197/1985, Views adopted on 27 July 1988.