and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on States parties in regard to their legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory.” lineage and kinship in the normal order of transfer mortis causa of titles of nobility are not discriminatory or in violation of article 14 of the Spanish Constitution of 27 December 1978, which is still in force, “since it declares that historical rights are applicable”. The aforementioned article of the Constitution provides that Spaniards are equal before the law. At the same time, in its general comment No. 28 on equality of rights between men and women, the Committee stated: Although the right to titles of nobility is not a human right protected by the Covenant, as the State party rightly contends, the legislation of States parties must not deviate from article 26. It is true that, as the Committee has pointed out in its jurisprudence, a difference in treatment based on arguments, including sex, of relevance to the purposes of article 26 does not constitute prohibited discrimination provided that it is based on reasonable and objective criteria. However, the establishment of the superiority of men over women, which is tantamount to saying that women are inferior to men, in matters of succession to titles of nobility governed by Spanish law and implemented by its courts, would not only deviate from such criteria but would be going to the opposite extreme. While States are allowed to grant legal protection to their historical traditions and institutions, they must do so in conformity with the requirements of article 26 of the Covenant. “Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female foetuses. States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant rights.” With regard to the prohibition of discrimination against women contained in article 26, the same general comment does not exclude in its application any field or area, as is made clear by the following statements contained in paragraph 31: The Committee is of the view that, in ruling legally that a particular honour should be granted principally to men and only accessorily to women, the State party is taking a discriminatory position vis-à-vis women of noble families that cannot be justified by reference to historical traditions or historical rights or on any other grounds. The Committee therefore concludes that the ban on sexual discrimination established by virtue of article 26 of the Covenant has been violated in the author’s case. This being so, it is unnecessary to consider whether there may have been a violation of article 17 in conjunction with article 3 of the Covenant. “The right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimination, protected by article 26, requires States to act against discrimination by public and private agencies in all fields.” “States parties should review their legislation and practices and take the lead in implementing all measures necessary to eliminate discrimination against women in all fields.” The Committee’s clear and unambiguous position in favour of equal rights between men and women, which requires States parties to amend their legislation and practices, should cause no surprise in a United Nations treaty body, since the Organization’s Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, reaffirms in its preamble faith in the equal rights of men and women as one of its fundamental objectives. However, history has shown that, in spite of the efforts that the recognition of rights requires, the most arduous task is to put them into practice, and that ongoing measures must be taken to ensure their effective implementation. I am therefore of the view that the facts before the Committee disclose a violation of article 26 of the Covenant with respect to Mercedes Carrión Barcáiztegui. Individual Opinion by Committee member, Ruth Wedgwood In its review of country reports, as well as in its Views on individual communications, the Human Rights Committee has upheld the rights of women to equal protection of the law, even in circumstances where compliance will require significant changes in local practice. It is thus troubling to see the Committee dismiss so cavalierly the communication of Mercedes Carrión Barcáiztegui. In the communication under consideration, María de la Concepción Barcáiztegui Uhagón, the previous holder of the disputed title of marquis, transferred her hereditary title of nobility to her brother Íñigo and, without entering into a consideration of the validity of the transfer, the Committee notes that, when María de la Concepción Barcáiztegui Uhagón died on 4 April 1993 without issue, the author, as the representative of her deceased mother, met the criterion of primogeniture. Believing that she had the better right, she initiated a legal action against her uncle, claiming the noble title of Marquis of Tabalosos. Madrid Court of First Instance No. 18 dismissed the author’s claim on the basis of the binding jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court which, in a divided judgement issued on 3 July 1997, ruled by majority that the better rights that the law grants to men over women of equal The distribution of family titles in Spain is regulated by public law. Decisions on succession to titles of honour or nobility are published as official acts of state in the Boletín Oficial del Estado. The order of succession is not a matter of private preference of the current titleholder. Rather, female descendants are statutorily barred from any senior claim to a title, pursuant to the preference for males regardless of the wishes of the ascendant titleholder. Such a statutory rule, see statute of 4 June 1948, would seem to be a public act of discrimination. 33