proceedings, even during the phase prior to the consideration of the complaint by the Committee itself.3 With reference to the decision in the Pretty v. United Kingdom case, referred to by the State party, the author points out that what Sampedro was asking for was not a positive measure on the part of the State, but that it should abstain from action and allow matters to take their course, in other words, not interfere in his decision to die. person’s privacy. Although the European Court had added that such interference is justified “for the protection of the rights of others”, this argument is in her view meaningless since no harm is done to anyone and even the family tries to assist the person taking the decision to die. 5.12 In written submissions dated 22 January and 20 March 2003, the author maintains that, contrary to the assertions of the State party, Mr. Sampedro was not able to die as he wished and that his death was neither peaceful, gentle nor painless. Rather, it was distressing since he had had to resort to potassium cyanide. 5.8 The author contends that Ramón Sampedro died without acknowledgement of the fact that his claim to die with dignity was backed by a human right. In her view, these constitute sufficient grounds to permit his heir to continue the case. She adds that she was not granted any compensation for the suffering she had to bear. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 6.1 Before considering any claims contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 5.9 The author makes reference to a judgement by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in 1997, concerning euthanasia, which stated that article 326 of the Colombian Criminal Code, which refers to compassionate homicide, did not criminally implicate the doctor who assisted terminally-ill persons to die if the free will of the passive subject of the act was exercised. That Court linked the prohibition of the punishment of assisted suicide to the fundamental right to a life of dignity and to protection of the independence of the individual.4 The author asserts that the law makes progress through the search for a just and peaceful order, and that to assist someone suffering from an incurable and painful illness to die is a normal reaction of solidarity and compassion innate in human beings. 6.2 Although the State party appears to assert that the communication is inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol because the author is not a « victim » in the meaning of that provision, the Committee notes that the author seeks to act on behalf of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán, who according to the author was a victim of a violation of the Covenant in that the authorities of the State party refused to allow his assisted suicide by granting protection from prosecution, to the doctor who would assist him in committing suicide. The Committee considers that the claims presented on behalf of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán, had become moot prior to the submission of the communication, by the decision of Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán to commit, on 12 January 1998, suicide with the assistance of others, and the decision of the authorities not to pursue proceeding against those involved. Consequently, the Committee considers that at the time of submission on 28 March 2001, Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán could not be considered a victim of an alleged violation of his rights under the Covenant in the meaning of article 1 of the Optional Protocol. Consequently, his claims are inadmissible under this provision. 5.10 She asserts that the State party indirectly obliged Ramón Sampedro to experience the suffering entailed by immobility. A constitutional State should not be permitted to impose that burden on a disabled person, and subordinate his existence to the convictions of others. In her opinion, the interference of the State in Ramón Sampedro’s right to die is incompatible with the Covenant, which in its preamble states that all the rights recognized in it derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. 5.11 As regards the alleged violation of the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference provided for in article 17, the author asserts that, even in the Pretty case, the European Court acknowledged that the State’s “criminal law prohibition” concerning the decision to die of a disabled person experiencing incurable suffering constituted interference in that 6.3 As to the author’s claim that her rights under article 14 of the Covenant were violated by the denial of her right to continue the procedures initiated by Mr. Ramón Sampedro Cameán before the Constitutional Court, the Committee considers that the author not having been a party to the original amparo proceedings before the Constitutional Court, has not sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility the existing of a violation of article 14, paragraph 1 of the Covenant. Consequently, this part 3 Communications Nos. 164/1984, Croess v. Netherlands, and 774/1997, Brok v. Czech Republic. Also cited is the jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture in case No. 14/1994, M’Barek Ben v. Tunisia. 4 Judgement of 20 May 1997. Action for constitutional review brought by José Eurípides Parra Parra. 38