communication should be declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Committee also notes that the author has four times attempted to obtain a cassation motion on the decision of the Supreme Court but that his requests were either rejected or unanswered. Considering that the parties concede that no domestic remedies are still available, and that the author's claim is based on the alleged absence of a possibility of review of the judgement of 4 May 1994, the Committee is of the opinion that the admissibility of this claim should be considered together with its merits. 7.3 Regarding the submission of a cassation motion, the Committee notes the State party's contention that, between 1 July 1994 and 4 May 1995, it was possible for the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the county courts or the chairpersons of the division of criminal cases of the above courts to entertain a cassation motion at the request of the author, that this possibility constitutes a right to review in the sense of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, and that the author did not use this right within the time limit of one year from the date the judgement entered into force, that is before 4 May 1995, in accordance with article 419 of the State party's Code of Criminal Procedure. The Committee on the other hand also notes the author's contention that the decision to submit a cassation motion, similarly to that of submitting a "supervisory protest", is an extraordinary right at the discretion of the authority who receives the request and does therefore not constitute an obligation to review a case decided by the Supreme Court at first instance. The Committee further notes the author's contention that the delay of one year referred to by the State party only concerns cassation motions aiming at worsening the situation of the accused. Consideration of the merits 7.1 Regarding the submission of a "supervisory protest", the Committee notes the State party's contention that the author had, between 4 May 1994 and 1 January 1995, a "right to address the Chairperson of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, the Prosecutor-General and their deputies with a request to submit a supervisory protest", that this possibility constitutes a right to review in the sense of article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, and that the author did not use this right. The Committee also notes the author's contention that the decision to submit a "supervisory protest" is an exceptional right depending on the discretion of the authority who receives the request and does therefore not constitute an obligation to review a case decided by the Supreme Court in first instance. 7.4 The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any comment on the author's arguments related to the prerogatives of the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the county courts or the chairpersons of the division of criminal cases of the above courts on the submission of a cassation motion and the time limit to submit an application for a cassation motion. In this regard, the Committee refers to two letters, transmitted by the author, dated 28 December 1998 (from the Chairman of the Division of the Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court) and 5 April 1996 (from the Chairman of the Supreme Court), both rejecting the application for a cassation motion on the grounds, respectively, that "the motives of [the] cassation complaint [...] are denied by evidence, [which] were examined in court and considered in the verdict" and that "[the State party's legislation] does not provide [that the Supreme Court] is a cassation instance for verdicts [...] adopted by itself. Verdicts of [the Supreme Court] are final and are not appealable." The Committee notes that these letters do not refer to a time limit. 7.2 In the present case, the Committee notes that, according to the wording of the last sentence of the judgement of 4 May 1994, "[t]he verdict is final and could not be protested or cassation appealed". It also notes that it is not contested by the State party that the submission of a "supervisory protest" constitutes an extraordinary remedy depending on the discretionary powers of the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General or their deputies. The Committee is therefore of the opinion that, in the circumstances, such a possibility is not a remedy that has to be exhausted for purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Covenant. Moreover, recalling its decision in case No. 701/1996,4 the Committee observes that article 14, paragraph 5, implies the right to a review of law and facts by a higher tribunal. The Committee considers that the request for the submission of a "supervisory protest" does not constitute a right to have one's sentence and conviction reviewed by a higher tribunal under article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant. 7.5 The Committee, taking into account the author's observations with regard to the extraordinary character and the discretionary nature of the submission of a cassation motion, the absence of response from the State party thereupon, and the form and content of the letters rejecting the applications for a cassation motion, considers that the material before it sufficiently demonstrates that, in the circumstances of the case, the applications made by the author for a cassation motion, even if they had been made before 4 4 Cesario Gómez Vásquez v. Spain, Communication No. 701/1996, Views adopted on 20 July 2000, paragraph 11.1. 105