about his parents’ location and funds he possessed. There was no administrative review of his detention during this period, and efforts at judicial review failed because there is no power to release him from detention. His release from custody on 10 August 1994 due to his deteriorating psychological condition came after two years of non-reviewable detention, as demonstrated by the futility of earlier applications to the Federal Court for review of the decision to detain. As to the continuing detention, there is no justification, for three separate psychiatric reports of March 2000 (provided to the Minister) indicated his risk would pose “no detectable risk”, he “has to be regarded as not demonstrating a significant risk to anybody any more”, and he poses “no risk to either his former victim or the Australian community”.60 The author also provides a further psychiatric report dated 7 May 2001 that found that he had made a complete recovery for several years, and constituted no threat to the community, either specifically or generally.61 article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol have not been met. 6.2 The State party remarks, in response to the author’s assertion that an “extra element of reprehensibleness” under article 7 was provided in the failure to release him despite knowledge of psychological damage caused by continuing detention, that he was in fact released by the Minister who considered that his mental health needs would benefit from family care. 6.3 The State party further understood the original complaint in terms of article 7 to relate only to the initial detention, but reads the author’s subsequent comments (and reference to the 7 May 2001 psychiatric report assessing the author’s current condition) as appearing to imply a fresh allegation in respect of the current detention as well. The State party responds that there is nothing to suggest that the current detention is particularly harsh or reprehensible so as to constitute a violation of article 7. It observes that the 7 May 2001 report found the author in good mental health, and did not provide any evidence of acts or practices suggesting that the current detention, per se or through its conditions, raised issues under article 7. Any suggestion that the current detention is causing the author psychological harm and therefore violating article 7 is unsustainable and should be dismissed as unfounded or inadmissible ratione materiae. Supplementary submissions by the parties 6.1 By submission of 16 August 2001, the State party reiterates certain earlier submissions and makes further arguments. As to admissibility, the State party rejects the author’s interpretation of RT v. France62 that only judicial remedies need be exhausted, for the decision refers to judicial remedies “in the first place”. Other administrative remedies are not excluded,63 and therefore a complaint to HREOC, for example, is not excluded from the requirement of exhaustion of remedies. Similarly, Vincente v. Colombia,64 according to the State party, only excludes administrative remedies that were not effective from the exhaustion requirement. Similarly, the State party contends that the Committee dispensed with the remedy argued in Ellis v. Jamaica65 (a petition for mercy in a capital case) as being an ineffective remedy, rather than an “unenforceable” one as the author claims. In this case, by contrast, the State party argues its administrative remedies are effective, were not pursued by the author, and thus the requirements of 6.4 Finally, as to the article 9 claim in relation to the original detention, the State party rejects as incorrect the author’s characterization that A v. Australia “conclusively established that Australia’s policy of mandatory detention was in breach of articles 9 (1) and 9 (4)”. Rather than commenting on the policy in abstracto, it found that “arbitrariness” was to be determined by the existence of appropriate justification for continued detention in the individual circumstances of the case. Indeed, it stated that it was not per se arbitrary to detain persons seeking asylum. 6.5 By submission of 21 September 2001, the author responded to the State party’s additional submissions, also clarifying that the claims under articles 7 and 9 relate to the current as well as the initial detention. As to admissibility, the author maintains that the administrative remedies raised by the State party are not “effective and enforceable” remedies. As any government decision to take action in response to a recommendation of either body is purely executive and discretionary in nature, exhaustion thereof should not be required.66 60 Reports by Prof. McGorry, dated 17 March 2000, Dr. Kenny, 7 March 2000, and Dr. Kulkarni, 10 March 2000. 61 Associate Professor Harry Minas, Centre for International Health, 7 May 2001 (see footnote 57, supra). 62 Op. cit. 63 In Maille v. France (689/1996), the communication was held inadmissible for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 64 Op. cit. 65 Op. cit. 6.6 As to the merits, the author rejects the State party’s argument that, as the 7 May 2001 report 66 153 The author again cites Ellis v. Jamaica, op. cit.