explained that the Austrian reservation was made on the basis of a recommendation by the Committee of Ministers, suggesting that member States of the Council of Europe “which sign or ratify the Optional Protocol might wish to make a declaration […] whose effect would be that the competence of the UN Human Rights Committee would not extend to receiving and considering individual complaints relating to cases which are being or already have been examined under the procedure provided for by the European Convention”.9 already been examined “under the procedure provided for by the European Convention”, as recommended by the Committee of Ministers, or from using the broader formulation of a previous examination by “another procedure of international investigation or settlement”, as other member States of the European Convention did. 7.2 Moreover, the author submits that the State party could even consider entering a reservation to that effect by re-ratifying the Optional Protocol, as long as such a reservation could be deemed compatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol. What is not permissible, in his view, is to broaden the scope of the existing reservation in a way contrary to fundamental rules of treaty interpretation. 6.2 The State party argues that its reservation differs from similar reservations made by other member States pursuant to that recommendation only insofar as it directly addresses the relevant Convention mechanism, for the sake of clarity. All reservations aim at preventing any further international examination following a decision of one of the mechanisms established by the European Convention. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to deny the Austrian reservation its validity and continued scope of application on the mere basis of an organizational reform of the Strasbourg organs. 7.3 The author rejects the State party’s argument that key tasks of the “new” European Court, such as decisions on admissibility and ascertainment of the facts of a case, were originally within the exclusive competence of the European Commission. By reference to the Court’s jurisprudence, he argues that the “old” European Court also consistently dealt with these matters. 6.3 Moreover, the State party contends that, following the merger of the European Commission and the “old” Court, the “new” European Court can be considered the “legal successor” of the Commission since several of its key functions, including decisions on admissibility, establishment of the facts of a case and making a first assessment on the merits, were formerly discharged by the Commission. Given that the reference to the European Commission in the State party’s reservation was specifically made in respect of these functions, the reservation remains fully operative after the entry into force of Protocol No. 11. The State party contends that it was not foreseeable, when it entered its reservation in 1987, that the protection mechanisms of the European Convention would be modified. 7.4 The author challenges the State party’s contention that the reorganization of the Convention organs was not foreseeable in 1987, by quoting parts of the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11, which summarize the history of the “merger” deliberations from 1982 until 1987. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 8.2 The Committee notes that the State party has invoked the reservation it made under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, which precludes the Committee from considering claims that have previously been “examined” by the “European Commission on Human Rights”. As to the author’s argument that the application which he submitted to the European Commission was, in fact, never examined by that organ but declared inadmissible by the European Court of Human Rights, the Committee observes that the European Court, as a result of treaty amendment by virtue of Protocol No. 11, has legally assumed the former European Commission’s tasks of receiving, deciding on the admissibility of, and making a first assessment on the merits of applications submitted under the European Convention. The Committee observes, for purposes of ascertaining the existence of parallel or, as the case may be, successive 6.4 The State party reiterates that the same matter was already examined by the European Court which, in order to reject the author’s application as being inadmissible, had to examine it on the merits, if only summarily. In particular, it follows from the European Court’s rejection of the complaints concerning the disciplinary proceedings that the Court considered the merits of the complaint prior to taking its decision. 7.1 By letter of 25 February 2002, the author notes that nothing prevented the State party from entering a reservation upon ratification of the Optional Protocol precluding the Committee from examining communications if the same matter has 9 Council of Europe, Committee Resolution (70) 17 of 15 May 1970. of Ministers, 25