Morse’. On July 10 1997, the authors displayed a sign outside their business. 2.4 On appeal, the Superior Court of the District of Bedford, on 13 April 2000, reversed the decision of the lower court. Through counsel, the authors’ corporation, believing that the burden of justification lay with the Attorney-General, declined the Court’s invitation to provide comprehensive evidence of why the restrictions of section 58 were not justified. The Superior Court considered, on its view of relevant Supreme Court precedent of 1988,3 that it was up to the challenging party to demonstrate that section 58’s limitations on freedom of expression were not justified. Specifically, it would have to be shown that the factors shown by the Supreme Court in the 1988 cases to justify a “marked predominance” requirement for French no longer applied.4 The authors’ corporation not having done so, it was accordingly convicted and fined $500. One side of the sign read: “LA LIONNE ET LE MORSE Antiquités Hot Tubs & Saunas Encadrement et cadeaux” And on the other side: “LYON AND THE WALRUS Antiquities Hot Tubs & Saunas Gifts” The sign was thus bilingual, except for the words “Hot Tubs” found on both sides. All the other words covered the same amount of space in each language and had equal size letters. 2.5 On 29 March 2001, the Court of Appeal rejected a motion of counsel for the authors’ corporation to file new evidence as to the linguistic profile in Québec, considering that the evidence did not relate to the dispute as defined by the authors’ corporation in the lower courts and on appeal. The Court recorded that the Superior Court had specifically invited the parties to submit new evidence, whose clear position was to proceed on the existing record. Furthermore, the Superior Court had considered the parties’ positions unequivocal and considered its equitable obligation to ensure neither party was taken by surprise to be fulfilled. 2.2 The authors’ corporation was charged with non-compliance with sections 581 and 2052 of the Charter of the French Language, which require the “marked predominance” of French on outdoor signs. Although admitting the facts constituting the offence, the authors claimed in their defence that these provisions were invalid, because they infringed their right to freedom of commercial expression and right to equality both under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 2.3 On 20 October 1999, the Court of Québec acquitted the authors’ corporation, accepting their defence that the relevant provisions of the Charter of the French Language were invalid. The Court considered that the provisions violated the right to freedom of expression protected both in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (section 2 (b)) and the Québec Charter of Rights and Freedoms (section 3), and that the Attorney-General of Québec had not demonstrated the restrictions to be reasonable. 2.6 On 24 October 2001, the Québec Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeals of the authors’ corporation. The Court of Appeal considered that the formulation of section 58 in 1993 had reflected previous comments by the Supreme Court of Canada that requiring a “marked predominance” of French would be constitutionally acceptable in view of Québec’s linguistic profile. The onus thus fell on the authors to show that there was no longer sufficient justification for what had at that point been considered acceptable restrictions. In the Court’s view, the authors’ arguments linguistic duality, multiculturalism, federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law and the 1 Section 58 provides: “Public signs and posters and commercial advertising must be in French. They may also be both in French and in another language provided that French is markedly predominant. However, the Government may determine, by regulation, the places, cases, conditions or circumstances where public signs must be in French only, where French need not be predominant or where such signs, posters and advertising may be in another language only.” 3 Ford v. Québec (Attorney-General) [1988] 2 SCR 712 and Devine v. Québec (Attorney-General) [1988] 2 SCR 790. 4 The Supreme Court identified the following factors in the above cases by way of justification: (a) the declining birth rate of Québec francophone resulting in a decline in the Québec francophone proportion of the Canadian population as a whole, (b) the decline of the francophone population outside Québec as a result of assimilation, (c) the greater rate of assimilation of immigrants by the Anglophone community of Québec, and (d) the continuing dominance of English at the higher levels of the economic sector. 2 Section 205 provides: “Every person who contravenes a provision of this Act or the regulations adopted by the Government thereunder commits an offence and is liable: (a) for each offence, to a fine of $250 to $700 in the case of a natural person, and to $500 to $1,400 in the case of an artificial person; (b) for any subsequent conviction, to a fine of $500 to $700 in the case of a natural person, and of $1,000 to $7,000 in the case of an artificial person. 46