Moreover, the Committee has held that a corporation owned by a single person did not have Optional Protocol standing. Accordingly, the communication is inadmissible for, in fact, being an impermissible suit by a corporation. argues that the Committee would short-circuit the domestic process if it required Québec at the present time to satisfy the Committee as to the appropriateness of section 58 of the Charter of the French Language before it had had the opportunity to do so in the domestic courts. 4.3 Thirdly, the State party argues that domestic remedies were not exhausted. The State party argues that the Superior Court, on first appeal, held contrary to the trial court’s view that it lay on the party challenging the Charter of the French Language to show by persuasive evidence that there was no justification for the restrictions (rather than lying on the Attorney-General to demonstrate justification). The Court then afforded the parties the opportunity to present new evidence, which they declined. It also gave counsel for the authors’ corporation (also counsel before the Committee) the right to present further evidence, if wished, at a new trial. Counsel declined. After declining the Superior Court’s invitation to supplement evidence, counsel for the corporation unsuccessfully attempted to do so in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered that the new evidence had no bearing on the matter in issue as defined by the appellant itself both in the lower courts and in its appeal factum. 4.5 Fourthly, the State party argues that the authors’ claims are not supported by, or do not correspond to, rights protected under the Covenant. As to the article 14 claim, the State party emphasizes the Committee’s deference to factual and evidentiary findings of domestic courts unless manifestly arbitrary, amounting to a denial of justice or revealing a clear breach of the judicial duty of impartiality. The authors’ corporation never raised these issues, nor do the arguments advanced support the allegations, as the record demonstrates the courts’ anxiety to respect fair process. This aspect is thus inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol, for having failed to establish a violation of article 14 of the Covenant, or under article 3 of the Optional Protocol, for incompatibility with article 14. 4.6 As to the claim under article 19, the current section 58 of the Charter of the French Language evolved in response to the Committee’s earlier Views and was presented in the State party’s fourth periodic report. In its concluding observations, the Committee offered no comment on this matter. The authors have thus not established a violation of article 19. As to the article 26 claim, the State party refers to the Committee’s earlier Views finding no breach of this article with respect to stricter legislation and thus submits there can be no violation. On article 27, the State party refers to the Committee’s earlier Views that minorities within a State, rather than a province of a State, are implicated by this article which is thus not presently applicable. Finally, article 2 is a corollary right linked to a substantive right, thus not giving rise to an individual claim. In any event, Canada’s legislative and administrative measures, polices and programs fully give effect to Covenant rights. 4.4 The State party emphasizes that counsel for the corporation was an experienced lawyer specializing in language law. Through counsel, the corporation chose to limit its evidence and define narrowly the legal question at issue before the national courts. This legal strategy failed, and the authors cannot now seek to revise the strategic decisions made by their counsel.9 Now that the issue of burden of proof has been resolved, there is ongoing litigation in the domestic courts concerning the constitutionality of section 58 of the Charter of the French Language. In almost all of several dozen cases, which were stayed pending the outcome of the litigation in the instant case, the same counsel is acting and has indicated to the Attorney-General of Québec that he will be filing the evidence not filed in the litigation on the instant case. On this question, then, all appeal instances are open and a decision of the Supreme Court will be necessary practically to determine the respective rights of the parties, as well as, in consequence, the rights of persons such as the authors and their corporation. The State party thus 5.1 By letter of 27 June 2004, the authors’ responded disputing the State party’s submissions. The authors, firstly, rely on the Committee’s decision in Singer to reject any ground of inadmissibility on the grounds of corporate rights. In Singer, the Committee considered with reference to the personal nature of freedom of expression that author individually, and not only his company, was personally affected by the Bills concerned. The only domestic difference between the cases being that Singer concerned a declaratory proceeding brought by Singer’s corporation, while the present case concerns a prosecution against the authors’ corporation, the authors invite the Committee to apply Singer. The authors argue that they have the freedom to impart information concerning their 9 The State party refers, by analogy, to the Committee’s constant jurisprudence in the article 14 context: Lewis v. Jamaica, Case No. 708/1996, adopted on 15 August 1997, Morrison v. Jamaica, Case No. 635/1995, adopted on 16 September 1998, Perera v. Australia, Case No. 536/1993, adopted on 28 March 1995, Leslie v. Jamaica, Case No. 564/1993, adopted on 19 August 1998, Morrison v. Jamaica, Case No. 611/1995, adopted on 19 August 1998. 48