CCPR/C/113/D/2013/2010 finds them insufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility and declares them inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 7.5 The Committee considers that the author’s remaining claims, raising issues under articles 6 (1–2), 7, 9 and 14 (2 and 3 (d) and (g)) of the Covenant, have been sufficiently substantiated for purposes of admissibility and proceeds to their examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered this communication in the light of all the information received, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s claims under articles 7 and 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant that he was subjected to physical and psychological pressure to force him to confess to a number of crimes and that his confession served subsequently as a basis for his conviction by the courts. The Committee also notes that those allegations have not been refuted by the State party. In that regard, the Committee recalls that, once a complaint about ill-treatment contrary to article 7 has been filed, a State party must investigate it promptly and impartially.9 It further recalls that the safeguard set out in article 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant must be understood in terms of the absence of any direct or indirect physical or undue psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. 10 The Committee notes that, despite clear signs that the author was tortured (see paras. 2.4–2.5), and complaints by his mother and the author himself in this connection, the State party has not presented any information to demonstrate that its authorities have conducted an effective investigation into those specific allegations. In those circumstances, the Committee decides that due weight must be given to the author’s allegations. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the facts before it disclose a violation of the author’s rights under articles 7 and 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant.11 8.3 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 9 (3) any person arrested or detained on a criminal charge “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”. The Committee also recalls that while the exact meaning of “promptly” may vary depending on objective circumstances, delays should not exceed a few days from the time of arrest. In the view of the Committee, 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to transport the individual and to prepare for the judicial hearing; any delay longer than 48 hours must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.12 The Committee takes note of the author’s unchallenged allegations that he was arrested on 14 October 2009, was officially placed in pretrial detention by the decision of a prosecutor on 21 October 2009 and was not brought before a judge until the beginning of the court trial, on 30 March 2010. The Committee thus considers that the author was not brought promptly before the judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power as required by article 9 (3) of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the above-mentioned facts reveal a violation of the author’s rights under article 9 (3) of the Covenant. In the light of this conclusion, the 9 10 11 12 8 See the Committee’s general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, para. 14. See, for example, general comment No. 32 (2007), para. 41; and communications No. 330/1988, Berry v. Jamaica, Views adopted on 4 July 1994, para. 11.7; No. 1033/2001, Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, Views adopted on 21 July 2004, para. 7.4; and No. 1769/2008, Ismailov v. Uzbekistan, Views adopted on 25 March 2011, para. 7.6. See, for example, general comment No. 32, para. 60; and communications No. 1401/2005, Kirpo v. Tajikistan, Views adopted on 27 October 2009, para. 6.3; and No. 1545/2007, Gunan v. Kyrgyzstan, Views adopted on 25 July 2011, para. 6.2. General comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 33.