CEDAW/C/71/D/101/2016 nationality, religion, health, class, caste, being lesbian, bisexual or transgender and other status (para. 16). The Committee further refers to its general recommendation No. 19 (1992) on violence against women, in which it recalls that gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention, and that such rights include the right to life and the right not to be subject to torture (para. 7). The Committee has further elaborated its interpretation of violence against women as a form of gender discrimination in its general recommendation No. 35 (2017) on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, in which it reaffirms the obligation of States parties to eliminate discrimination against women, including gender-based violence, resulting from the acts or omissions of the State party or its actors, on the one hand, and non-State actors, on the other (para. 21). 6.7 In the case at hand, the Committee observes that there is no claim that the State party has directly violated the provisions of the Convention, but rather that the violation would occur if the State party returned the author to Somalia, thereby exposing her to the risk of serious forms of gender-based violence. 6.8 The Committee takes note of the author’s claim that, even though her counsel has invited the Refugee Appeals Board to examine her asylum case from the perspective of the Convention, the Board made no reference to the Convention in its decision. The Committee recalls that significant weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party’s authorities, unless it can be established that the evaluation in question was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 10 The Committee also notes that the author’s counsel, when addressing the Board, has not formulated any clear claim under specific provisions of the Convention but has rather invited the authorities to bear the Convention in mind, in general, when examining the author’s case. The Committee notes in that connection that the fact that the Board does not refer to a particular convention in its decision does not mean, per se, that it has assessed a particular case with no consideration of the Convention in question. In the light of this and in the absence of any evidence in the case file establishing that the Board’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary with respect to the author’s allegations, the Committee considers that this part of the communication is inadmissible, as manifestly ill-founded under article 4 (2) (c) of the Optional Protocol. 6.9 The Committee further takes note of the State party’s contention that all the author’s allegations were thoroughly examined by the Danish Immigration Service and the Refugee Appeals Board, which dismissed them in their entirety beca use of a negative credibility finding that vitiated her claim. The Committee recalls that it is generally for the authorities of States parties to the Convention to evaluate the facts and evidence or the application of national law in a particular case, 11 unless it can be established that the evaluation was biased or based on gender stereotypes that constitute discrimination against women, was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 12 In that regard, the Committee notes that, in substance, the a uthor is challenging the manner in which the State party’s asylum authorities assessed the factual circumstances of her case, applied the provisions of the national legislation and reached their conclusions to the effect that she cannot be granted asylum i n Denmark. The issue before the Committee is, therefore, whether there was any __________________ 10 11 12 18-20335 See, among others, S.F.A. vs. Denmark, para. 9.7. See, for example, S.J.A. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/68/D/79/2014), paras. 7.9 and 7.10. See also A.S. v. Denmark (CEDAW/C/69/D/80/2015), para. 8.7. See, for example, N.Q. v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CEDAW/C/63/D/62/2013). 11/12