CCPR/C/114/D/2395/2014 M.G., someone who had openly expressed views opposed to the Armed Forces and who was removed from her post by the same regime that governed the State party between 1973 and 1985. In addition, the courts failed to find that the offence of homicide for which he was tried under articles 117 and 119 of the Criminal Code was time-barred, but arbitrarily ruled that the limitation period started to run from 1 March 1985 and that the concept of dangerousness, established in article 123 of the Criminal Code, was applicable to the author ’s case, so as to be able to extend the period of limitation for the offence by one third, without taking into account his age, his state of health and the fact that he has never evaded justice. 9.5 The Committee also takes note of the State party’s arguments that the author was given a criminal trial with all judicial guarantees that was conducted by independent and impartial courts; that the courts found him criminally liable after examining and weighing all the evidence against him; and that the evidence used in the trial for aggravated homicide attested to the author ’s extreme dangerousness, which is why an extension of the period of limitation under article 123 of the Criminal Code was applicable. Moreover, the judicial decision to take 1 March 1985 as the start date for calculating the limitation period was not arbitrary, and the ev idence submitted to the courts showed that the author was responsible for gross and systematic human rights violations, such as enforced disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killing, and arbitrary and unlawful detention, committed in the State party under a civil-military dictatorship between 1973 and 1985. 9.6 The Committee notes that, at this point in the communication, the author ’s claims basically refer to the evaluation of the facts and the evidence, and the application of domestic legislation by the courts of the State party. The Committee recalls its case law, according to which it is for the courts of States parties to evaluate the facts and the evidence in each case, or the application of domestic legislation, unless it can be shown that such evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 6 The Committee has examined the materials submitted by the author, including the decisions of Court No. 19, the Appeals Court and the Supreme Court, dated 26 March 2009, 4 February 2010 and 6 May 2011, respectively, and considers that these materials do not demonstrate that the proceedings against the author suffered from such defects. The Committee also notes that the decision to take 1 March 1985 as the starting date for calculating the period of limitation was not arbitrary, since it took into account the fact that that was the date when democracy was restored in the State party and that, before that date, the judicial authorities had not, in practice, enjoyed full guarantees and freedom to bring criminal proceedings; it also took into account the seriousness of the acts being tried, given that they might constitute serious violations of human rights under the Covenant and other international treaties. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the criminal proceedings taken against the author did not violate his rights under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 10. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts before it do not reveal a breach of any provision of the Covenant. __________________ 6 GE.15-13662 See communication No. 1616/2007, Manzano et al. v. Colombia, decision adopted on 19 March 2010, para. 6.4; and communication No. 1622/2007, L.D.L.P. v. Spain, decision adopted on 26 July 2011, para. 6.3. 13/13