CCPR/C/114/D/2395/2014 evidence submitted at trial was inconsistent, and his sentence was based on testimony from biased witnesses and information from one -sided newspaper research and biased publications, in violation of due process and the right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. The evidence was collected with no regard for judicial guarantees, no oversight by his counsel and no certainty as to its authenticity or provenance. He claims that, at every hearing, the same witnesses appeared — all of them former Armed Forces detainees. The author adds that he was persecuted as an “enemy of the State”, including for offences committed in other countries, which were also investigated in those countries on the basis of different factual assumptions and with other persons being found responsible. The courts failed to take account of the provision contained in article 29 of the Criminal Code regulating due obedience, which precludes criminal liability in a military structure. Moreover, in most proceedings brought against military and police personnel, the prosecutor was M.G., someone who has openly expressed views opposed to the Armed Forces. 3.3 The author claims that the cases brought against him are time -barred under articles 117 and 119 of the Criminal Code, and that the judge should therefore have declined to try them, and the prosecutor should have sought their dismissal. However, the State party’s courts arbitrarily determined that the period of limitation should begin to run from 1 March 1985, despite the absence of any legal provision to that effect. Contrary to the findings of Court No. 19, the author submits that, before that date, the courts were free to try any case within the State party ’s legal order. He adds that even taking 1 March 1985 as the starting date, the offence of homicide for which he was tried became subject to limitation in 2005. However, in his case, the courts applied the concept of dangerousness under article 123 of the Criminal Code in order to extend the period of limitation for that offence. The application of that article to his case is unlawful and arbitrary, considering his age, his state of health and the fact that he has never evaded justice. 3.4 The author argues that the State party’s Constitution enshrines the principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal law, and that, consequently, Act No. 18026 of 25 September 2006 cannot be applied in his case, since the acts for which he is being tried occurred some 30 years earlier. 3.5 Some of the acts for which he was sentenced in 2009 had, prior to that date, already been adjudicated on the basis of a decision vested with res judicata effect. In this regard the author notes that, in the context of the proceedings brought by J.G. in relation to the offences of deprivation of liberty and homicide of M.C.G., the Supreme Court had dismissed the constitutional challenge brought against article 3 of Act No. 15848 and had closed the case. 4 Later, however, with no regard for the Supreme Court judgement, the author was tried for offences committed against M.C.G., in violation of the principles of res judicata and ne bis in idem. Moreover, the Supreme Court went against its own case law, which between 1985 and 2005 had consistently found Act No. 15848 to be constitutional. The Act had even been successful ly put to a referendum on two occasions. 3.6 The author’s detention in 2006 was arbitrary, illegal and motivated by a spirit of revenge. In this context, the Court decided arbitrarily not to apply Act No. 15848, which was still in force. 3.7 The courts arbitrarily and unreasonably denied the author ’s applications to serve his sentence under house arrest. In his case, this denial amounts to treatment contrary to his rights under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. In this connection, the author states that he is over 72 years old and in very frail health; that he needs constant care; that he has on several occasions been admitted to the Military Hospital; and that he __________________ 4 6/13 See footnote 2 above. GE.15-13662