CAT/C/46/D/369/2008 consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim of such assessment, however, is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence in a country of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on his or her return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person may not be subjected to torture in his or her specific situation. 10.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 on implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22,6 which states that the Committee must assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of torture if returned to the country in question. The risk of torture need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard, the Committee has established in previous decisions that the risk of torture must be “foreseeable, real and personal”.7 10.5 As to the burden of proof, the Committee again recalls its general comment No. 1 and its case law, which provides that the burden is generally on the complainant to present an arguable case and that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. In its general comment, the Committee also emphasized that it would give considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned but reserved the power to freely assess the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case.8 10.6 In assessing the risk of torture in the case under consideration, the Committee takes note of the complainant’s claim that he was president of the Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) youth movement and that he was forced to leave the country because of his political opinion. It also notes that in Côte d’Ivoire, the complainant continued his political activities, joined the Cercle d’études pour le retour de la democratie au Congo (Discussion group for a return to democracy in the Congo) (CERDEC) and created an association known as Jeunesse pour la paix, l’entreprise et l’unité (Youth for peace, enterprise and unity) (JE-PEU). The Committee notes the complainant’s assertion that his relationship to the president of CERDEC Russia-CIS, a prominent person known to be very hostile to the Sassou-Nguesso Government, would mean that he was likely to face persecution. Lastly, it notes that the complainant is said to have been targeted by the Young Patriots in Côte d’Ivoire as a supporter of Ouattara in the north, and that returning to Côte d’Ivoire would thus be likely to expose him to real danger without protection from the State. 10.7 The Committee further notes the State party’s argument that, apart from the identity documents of his alleged brother and an article reporting the arrest in December 2008 of a high-ranking member of CERDEC, the complainant has not submitted any new evidence to the Committee, and all other documents have been considered in depth by the domestic courts. The Committee notes that the State party believes that the peace agreements and the amnesty laws adopted by the Congo have given rise to a new situation that was not one of generalized civil war and, further, notes that the complainant does not come from Pool but 6 7 8 8 A/53/44, annex IX. Communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. the Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3; communication No. 285/2006, A.A. et al. v. Switzerland, Views adopted on 10 November 2008, para. 7.6. See communication No. 195/2002, Brada v. France, decision adopted on 17 May 2005, para. 13.2. GE.11-43871