CCPR/C/122/D/2398/2014 right to an effective remedy as recognized in article 2 (3) of the Covenant. He accordingly considers that Mohamed Millis was deprived of his right to an effective remedy and that the Algerian State has failed in its obligation under article 2 (3) of the Covenant. 3.5 The author recalls the developments in the Committee’s jurisprudence regarding enforced disappearances and considers that the mere risk or danger of loss of a person’s life in the context of enforced disappearance is enough to justify a finding of a direct violation of article 6 of the Covenant. He recalls the facts surrounding the disappearance of his son, Mohamed Millis, and considers that the chances of finding him are shrinking by the day, and either that his son has lost his life or that incommunicado detention represents an extremely high risk to the right to life, since victims are at the mercy of their jailers, who are outside of any control. He therefore considers that the State party has failed in its duty to protect the right to life of his son, Mohamed Millis, in violation of article 6 of the Covenant. 3.6 The author argues that the circumstances of the disappearance of Mohamed Millis, namely the total secrecy surrounding the reasons for his arrest, his place of detention and his state of health, and the lack of contact with his family and the outside world, imply the offence of incommunicado detention and constitute a form of inhuman or degrading treatment in respect of him, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant. He also alleges that he and his family have experienced anguish and distress as a result of the disappearance of Mohamed Millis and the lack of a thorough investigation and official confirmation of the fate of their missing relative, as the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation and its implementing legislation constitute an obstacle to the right to truth for the families of missing persons. He recalls that this right is protected under article 24 (2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and is recognized by the Committee’s jurisprudence. Accordingly, he considers that the anguish and distress that he has experienced, combined with the impossibility of ascertaining the truth owing to the existence of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation and its implementing legislation, constitute a form of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment amounting to a violation of article 7, read in conjunction with article 2 (3) of the Covenant, with regard to him and his family. 3.7 Recalling the guarantee of the right of everyone to liberty and security set forth in article 9 of the Covenant, which prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, the author submits that the circumstances of the arrest and detention of Mohamed Millis constitute an arbitrary deprivation of his liberty and security of person. He therefore considers that his son has been deprived of the guarantees set out in article 9 of the Covenant, amounting to a violation of that article in his regard. 3.8 Recalling the provisions of article 10 of the Covenant, the author also argues that, in the absence of any investigation by the Algerian authorities, Mohamed Millis was deprived of his liberty and was not treated with humanity and dignity, constituting a violation of article 10 of the Covenant in his regard. 3.9 Recalling the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant and the Committee’s general comment No. 32 on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 3 the author submits that, in practice and for political reasons, prosecutors apply article 45 of Ordinance No. 06-01 on the implementation of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation very broadly and refuse to investigate any complaint concerning a case of enforced disappearance, whether against public officials or persons unknown, or requesting an investigation even when the names of the perpetrators of the disappearances are known, as in this case. 3.10 The author then recalls the provisions of article 16 of the Covenant and the Committee’s established jurisprudence, according to which the intentional removal of a person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time may constitute a refusal of recognition as a person before the law if the victim was in the hands of the State authorities when last seen, and if the efforts of relatives to obtain access to effective remedies, including judicial remedies, have been systematically impeded. He also refers to 3 GE.18-10582 General comment No. 32 on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 9. 5