CAT/C/71/D/874/2018 which he or she would be returned.11 It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 12 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, according to which the non-refoulement obligation exists whenever there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee recalls that substantial grounds exist whenever the risk of torture is foreseeable, personal, present and real.13 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: (a) the complainant’s ethnic background; (b) political affiliation or political activities of the complainant or the complainant’s family members; (c) arrest or detention without guarantee of a fair treatment and trial; (d) incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; and (e) religious affiliation.14 8.5 The Committee recalls that the burden of proof is upon the complainant, who must present an arguable case, namely, submit arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. However, when the complainant is in a situation where he or she cannot elaborate on his or her case, for instance when the complainant has demonstrated that he or she has no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to his or her allegation of torture or is deprived of his or her liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and it is up to the State party concerned to investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the complaint is based.15 The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however, it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment of the information available to it in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case.16 8.6 In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee takes note of the complainant’s allegations that, as a Christian convert and an active proselytizer of Christianity, he risks being subjected to torture and possible death by the Afghan authorities and the Taliban if returned to Afghanistan. The Committee also takes note of the complainant’s argument that the Swedish authorities’ assessment of his claims was arbitrary and deficient and that the State party had failed to assess in substance his proselytizing activities. 8.7 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the complainant had ample opportunity to explain the relevant facts and circumstances in support of his claim and to argue his case, orally as well as in writing, before the migration authorities regarding his alleged grounds for asylum protection as a Christian convert. It also takes note of the State party’s argument that the domestic authorities questioned the sincerity of the complainant’s conversion after a thorough investigation of his claims and came to the conclusion that his conversion was not genuine and that he could not be expected to continue his Christian activities upon return to Afghanistan. The Committee further takes note of the State party’s observations that the complainant’s claims about the threat received in relation to his conversion from the Taliban have been assessed and found not to be credible by the domestic authorities. The Committee notes that the explanation by the State party that the matter of 11 12 13 14 15 16 See, inter alia, X v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/470/2011). See, inter alia, S.K. and others v. Sweden (CAT/C/54/D/550/2013), para. 7.3. Committee’s General comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, para. 11. Ibid., para. 45. Ibid., para. 38. Ibid., para. 50. 9