legislation had established the Ombudsman solely as the NPM. Countries where the Ombudsman was involved in the inclusion of NGOs in the process of the creation or designation of an NPM included Moldova, Slovenia and Denmark. The conference in Montenegro also discussed the danger of the exclusion of qualified NGOs that were viewed unfavourably by the government, and proposed that a selection procedure be put in place that avoided arbitrary selection or undue exclusion. With regard to the appropriateness of Ombudsman offices as NPMs, concerns were raised as to how to reconcile the preventive role envisaged for an NPM under the Protocol with the Ombudsman office’s responsibilities for making recommendations and operating in a co-operative and often confidential manner with the authorities. Existing quasi-legal aspects of Ombudsman’s mandates, including the power to initiate criminal proceedings (Czech Republic) or issue reprimands (Finland), could prove an obstacle to a preventive approach. These issues have not been resolved, and how they will be is only likely to become clearer as more NPMs become operational. One point raised was that, in many cases, existing legislation covering Ombudsman offices would need to be amended in order for the Ombudsman to be able to fulfil tasks stipulated by OPCAT. Some broader issues also arose with regard to the mandate of NPMs. One suggestion was that monitoring the effectiveness of any investigations by the authorities should also be one of the NPM’s roles. At the very least, it was concluded, this needs to be carried out in a complementary manner in the context of NPM activity. The Czech Ombudsman had confronted the issue of how its mandate could be implemented in relation to privately owned and managed institutions, such as residential care facilities. A key issue for most Ombudsman offices was funding. In most cases, the expectation was that an increase in financial resources would be necessary for existing Ombudsman offices to take on monitoring places of deprivation of liberty and the follow-up activities required by the Protocol. Although it was also noted that one reason Ombudsman offices were popular choices as NPMs was that this avoided the expense of setting up new institutions. Ombudsman offices were also a natural choice in that, in most cases, they already had a mandate to deal with complaints from detainees and/or to visit places of deprivation of liberty. Part of the discussion focused on the reference made in Article 18 (4) of the Protocol to the Paris Principles 30 and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs): “When establishing national preventive mechanisms, States Parties shall give due consideration to the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.” In particular, there was the question of what would happen if an NHRI had been refused accreditation by the International Co-ordinating Committee of NHRIs for not being sufficiently independent or failing to fulfil other requirements under the Paris 30 “Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,” UNHCHR website, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm#annex>. 37