CCPR/C/128/D/2568/2015 to their homes are summarily denied by the Government, which evicted them, 30 or face harassment or violence. The authors argue that, given that there are no remedies that are available or effective, their communication should not be precluded by the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 31 The authors also submit that the subject matter of the communication is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 3.7 In that context, the authors request the Committee to declare that the State party has violated articles 2 (3), 6, 7 and 17 of the Covenant and to recommend that the State party provide legal protection against forced evictions, harassment and threats against the Barangay Corazon de Jesus community, as well as to halt all forms of intimidation and retaliation against the authors of the present communication and their advocates. They consider that the State party should also transfer the residents of Barangay Corazon de Jesus who were improperly relocated to a suitable location, with proper access to employment, basic facilities and adequate social services, and ensure that they have the right to actively, freely and meaningfully participate in any decision relating to their lives and living conditions. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 On 22 March 2016, the State party submitted its observations on the admissibility and the merits of the communication, arguing that the communication was inadmissible due to a lack of substantiation and non-exhaustion of all available domestic remedies, pursuant to articles 2 and 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol and rule 96 (b) and (f) of the Committee’s rules of procedure. 4.2 The State party contests the authors’ assertion that it would be pursuing a “legal strategy to legitimize the dispossession of the concerned land” that a previous president had awarded to them by issuing proclamation No. 164. The authors challenged the State party’s exception invalidating the proclamation in the case decided by the Supreme Court. Although the authors were unsuccessful, they maintained that the Supreme Court decision of 29 September 1997 pointed to a concerted effort by the State party to deny them their “legitimate claim to the land” and left them with “no legal recourse to contest their eviction”. 4.3 The State party recalls that, on 17 February 1978, then-President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metropolitan Manila, as the site of the municipal government centre. The local government of San Juan then constructed separate buildings for its police force, firefighters, trial courts, public prosecutors and post office and a high school on the land. On 6 October 1987, Ms. Aquino issued proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Proclamation No. 164 declared certain parcels of land, which were not being used for purposes of the government centre site, but were actually being occupied for residential purposes, as excluded from the scope of Proclamation No. 1716 and therefore available for disposition under the Public Land Act. 4.4 The Supreme Court, however, declared proclamation No. 164 as unconstitutional for being a “clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch”, given that proclamation No. 164 was issued on 6 October 1987, when sole legislative power had already transferred to Congress. 32 The Supreme Court evaluated the facts and the evidence and ruled on the validity of proclamation No. 164. Contrary to the claims of the authors, the ruling was anchored in the Constitution and did not constitute an arbitrary or unjustified refusal to “acknowledge” or “accept” proclamation No. 164. In the view of the State party, the authors requested the Committee to reassess the evaluation of facts and evidence already carried out by the domestic courts, without substantiating that such evaluation was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. If a court reached a reasonable 30 31 32 Supreme Court of the Philippines, Third Division, Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association et al. There has been no information provided as to what remedies, if any, have been exhausted with regard to the authors’ claims under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Supreme Court of the Philippines, Third Division, Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association et al. 7