CAT/C/65/D/841/2017 application is pending before the Federal Administrative Court, and the complainant is authorized to remain in Switzerland until a decision is reached in that proceeding. Furthermore, because the complainant did not mention the wanted notification at any point of the asylum procedure, despite it being dated 14 December 2016, the national authorities were unable to consider this piece of evidence before the present communication was submitted to the Committee. 4.3 On the merits, the State party points out that, under article 3 of the Convention, States parties are prohibited from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities should take into account all relevant considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. With regard to the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, the State party adds that the author must establish the existence of a personal, present and substantial risk of being subjected to torture upon return to his or her country of origin. The existence of such a risk must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. There must be grounds for describing the risk of torture as “substantial” (see general comment No. 1, paras. 6 and 7). The following elements must be taken into account in this regard: any evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the country of origin; any claims of torture or illtreatment in the recent past and independent evidence to support those claims; the political activity of the author within or outside the country of origin; any evidence as to the credibility of the author; and any factual inconsistencies in the author’s claims (ibid., para. 8). 4.4 The State party points out that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights does not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds for believing that a particular person would be subjected to torture upon return to his or her country of origin. The Committee must establish whether the complainant is “personally” at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be expelled. 8 Additional grounds must be adduced in order for the risk of torture to qualify as “foreseeable, real and personal” for the purposes of article 3 (1) of the Convention. 9 The risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion (see general comment No. 1, paras. 6). 4.5 Regarding the general situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Federal Administrative Court noted in its decision of 21 August 2017 that notwithstanding local unrest and clashes of an episodic nature, the country is not at war, civil or otherwise, or plagued by generalized violence that would lead spontaneously – and independently of the circumstances of the present case – to the presumption that all complainants from this State face real danger. Moreover, the general situation in the country does not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds to conclude that the complainant would be at risk of torture if he returned there. 10 Yet, the complainant did not adduce evidence that he would face a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture if expelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 4.6 With regard to claims of torture or ill-treatment in the recent past and the existence of independent evidence to support those claims, the State party points out that States parties to the Convention have a duty to consider any such claims with a view to assessing the risk that the complainant concerned would be subjected to torture if he or she were sent back to his or her country of origin (see general comment No. 1, para. 8 (b)). The State party recalls that the complainant has not claimed to have been subjected to torture or illtreatment in his country of origin. He lived in Kinshasa until the age of 37, where he 8 9 10 GE.19-01119 See K.N. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/20/D/94/1997), para. 10.2. Ibid., para. 10.5 and J.U.A. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/21/D/100/1997), paras. 6.3 and 6.5. See M.F. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/59/D/658/2015), para. 7.3, and T.Z. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/62/D/688/2015), para. 8.4. 5