CAT/C/23/D/63/1997 page 8 5.4 The author also contests the State party’s claim that his immediate and rapid deportation was necessary for reasons of public order. Although he was in Fresnes prison, the French authorities chose to have him taken to the Franco-Spanish border, which was the furthest from Paris, yet as a European citizen Mr. Arkauz was entitled to stay and move freely in any part of the European Union, including countries with much less distant borders. According to the author, this is further evidence of the fact that the French authorities deliberately and consciously put him in the hands of the Spanish security forces. 5.5 With regard to domestic remedies, the author first of all submits that the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies concerns available, i.e. accessible, remedies. However, he was prevented from having access to the available remedies. The deportation order was carried out immediately by the French police, who allegedly forbade him to warn his wife and counsel. It would thus have been physically impossible for him to communicate with them to inform them that he had been notified of the deportation order and to ask them to file an immediate appeal against his deportation. Furthermore, the French authorities allegedly refused to give them any information on what had happened to him. 5.6 Secondly, Mr. Arkauz argues that, under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention, the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply when their application is unreasonably prolonged. He adds that domestic remedies against deportation must have an immediate and suspensive effect. In the present case, however, no judge could have made a ruling within a “reasonable” time, since the decisions in question were enforced immediately the person concerned had been notified of them. 5.7 Thirdly, Mr. Arkauz submits that, under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), the rule of the exhaustion of remedies concerns effective and adequate remedies, and therefore does not apply if the remedies are unlikely to bring relief to the individual concerned. In the present case, neither the administrative remedy nor the judicial remedy proposed by the State party can be considered effective or adequate. 5.8 As regards the administrative remedy, the author points out that, as a preventive measure, he had applied to the Administrative Court of Limoges against his deportation and that the court had reached a decision on that application only after the deportation had been carried out. In response to the State party’s argument that he could have reapplied to the administrative court, on being notified of the deportation order and of the order indicating Spain as the country of return, for a stay of execution or for the application of article L.10 of the Code of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts of Appeal, Mr. Arkauz states that this remedy would have been no more effective than its predecessor. 5.9 As regards the judicial remedy, the author contests the theory of flagrant irregularity put forward by the State party. He states that this theory is applicable in French law only under exceptional circumstances, in particular when the administration has taken a decision which manifestly cannot be related to a power conferred upon it or when it has enforced a decision of its own volition although it manifestly did not have the authority to do so, which is not the case in the present instance. Mr. Arkauz quotes rulings of the Court of Conflicts to the effect that neither a deportation decision, even if illegal, nor a decision to enforce it may be termed flagrant irregularities, and hence only the administrative courts have jurisdiction in such matters.