certain categories of visitors. The admission conditions regarding people visiting their imprisoned relative must, as far as possible, be tailored to specific situations". The same circular further provides that "when a visitor is fitted with an implantable pacemaker and that a certificate determines the possibility of electromagnetic interference, it is up to the institution director to subject the person in question, with their consent, to security frisking by an agent of the same sex". In reply, the institution director indicated that walking through the metal detector was not incompatible with the device with which the prisoner's mother had been fitted according to the detector's security leaflet, which certified that the equipment did not pose any danger for people fitted with pacemakers. He added that a note from the Prison Administration Department dated 31 May 2006 stressed the fact that no exception could be made to checks carried out on people accessing a prison and that "walking through the detector does not pose a danger for people fitted with pacemakers". In light of this reply, the Chief Inspector contacted the Interregional Director for Prison Services for the region concerned. The latter replied that there was, indeed, cause for a principle of precaution to be applied. Accordingly, the check procedure could be adapted according to the terms of the 2012 circular if the medical certificate determined the possibility of electromagnetic interference and not just because the person was fitted with a cardiac defibrillator or pacemaker. He indicated that, in that case, the person concerned had to show a valid, dated medical certificate clarifying the formal contraindication to walk through a metal detector. Much like the on-site verification carried out at the Privas remand prison in 2016 on the conditions for disabled people to access the visiting rooms (see below), this case is characteristic of the difficulties encountered by prisoners or their families when the security measures need to be tailored to specific situations. The CGLPL is remaining on its guard as regards this issue, which is fundamental for clearly guaranteeing that prisoners can maintain family ties. 1.4 Access to family lounges for people placed in disciplinary and solitary confinement wings Informed of the repeated refusal on the part of a long-stay prison's management to grant access to family visiting rooms to a prisoner being voluntarily accommodated in a disciplinary wing , contrary to his assignment, and then placed in solitary confinement at his request, the Chief Inspector wished to know what the reasons were for this restriction of the right to maintain ties with the outside world. In reply, the director indicated that access to family visiting rooms should not be a given and was subject to the decision of the institution director after consulting the Single multidisciplinary committee (CPU). He also submitted the refusal decisions, which indicated the following reasons: "must commit to his detention pathway"; "except on condition that he leave the solitary confinement wing to commit to his planned detention"; "you are responsible for committing to your detention by returning to ordinary detention. You benefit from conventional visiting rooms on a regular basis". The director explained that the person in question had recently been granted access to a family visiting room while still being placed in the solitary confinement wing. In reply, the Chief Inspector pointed out that the aforementioned grounds for refusal were contrary to the law and that the refusal to grant access to a family visiting room as a means of persuading the person to leave solitary confinement violated the right to maintain family ties. She drew the institution director's attention to Article 36 of the Act of 24 November 2009, which provides that "any prisoner may benefit, at their request, from at least one quarterly visit in a family living 71