CEDAW/C/74/D/126/2018 courts with an opportunity to address the claim. 7 This obligation does not apply where it is shown that the application of domestic remedies is unreasona bly prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief. 8 6.4 The Committee notes the State party’s position that the communication is inadmissible under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol because the authors have not exhausted domestic remedies, since the Undercover Policing Inquiry, which began in 2015, is ongoing. The Committee notes the State party’s statement that the final report on the Inquiry is expected to be issued in 2023. The Committee considers that this remedy is being unreasonably prolonged and that the authors are therefore not required to exhaust it. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the ongoing Inquiry does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the communication under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 6.5 The Committee also notes the State party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol because the authors lack victim status. The Committee notes the State party’s position that the authors reached “full and final” settlements with the Government to settle their claims at the national level, and agreed to terminate all proceedings with final effect. The Committee observes that the authors’ complaints at the national level included, for A.J. and S.B., claims of torture and violations of the right to privacy and family life and, for all seven authors, claims of assault/battery, misfeasance, negligence and deceit by the police officers. The Committee also notes the factual claims made by D.L., R.B., T.B., B.H. and H.S. regarding the discriminatory impact of the policing practice and policy on them as women. While noting the authors’ argument that the settlement agreements do not provide full reparation for the harm that they suffered, the Committee also notes that the terms of the agreement indicate a “full” settlement and an unequivocal waiver of further related claims by the authors. The Committee observes that, under the settlement agreements, the authors each obtained substantial financial compensation. The Committee also notes that, pursuant to the agreement, each author also received payment for legal costs, as well as a public apology published on 20 November 2015. The Committee observes that in the apology the relationships were characterized as “abusive, deceitful, manipulative and wrong”, and that they constituted “a violation of the women’s human rights, an abuse of police power and caused significant trauma”. It was further stated in the apology that the relationships should never have happened and were a “gross violation of personal dignity and integrity”, and “may well have reflected attitudes towards women that should have no part in the culture of the Metropolitan Police”. It was also recognized in the apology that “money alone cannot compensate the loss of time, [the authors’] hurt or the feelings of abuse caused by these relationships”. Noting the authors’ position that guarantees of non-repetition were not provided, the Committee also notes that the apology includes the following statement: “I can state that sexual relationships between undercover police officers and members of the public should not happen. … [It] would never be authorized in advance nor indeed used as a tactic of a deployment”. The Committee takes note of the authors’ claims that they retain victim status because the settlement agreement was not voluntary, since they felt compelled to accept it in order to retain their insurance policy, without which they could have been liable for significant legal costs in the event that their claims were unsuccessful. The Committee, however, also notes the authors’ information that their insurance policy required them to accept a settlement offer only if counsel advised that it was reasonable. The Committee notes that the authors were represented during se ttlement proceedings by counsel of their own choosing. It also notes that the authors have not indicated that they expressed concerns to their counsel and the State party ’s __________________ 7 8 14/15 See, inter alia, N. v. the Netherlands (CEDAW/C/57/D/39/2012), para. 6.3. See, inter alia, X. v. Austria (CEDAW/C/64/D/67/2014), para. 6.4. 19-22187