4.8With regard to the merits of the complaint, the State party notes that the sole complaint made by the complainant deals only with the additional extradition request. It in no way questions the first extradition request, which was based on separate facts that in themselves would have been sufficient to justify a decision to extradite the complainant, after the indictment division ruled in favour of extradition on 18 March 1998. Thus, the extradition order itself had not been questioned, only the fact that the State party’s decision to extradite the complainant had not been accompanied by a reservation concerning the facts related to Mr. Azurmendi’s statements. 4.9Under the State party’s legislation, the Act of 10 March 1927 applies in cases of requests for extradition made by Spain. Pursuant to article 16 of the Act, the indictment division must verify whether or not the legal conditions for extradition have been met. In this regard, it must verify whether or not the file has been properly prepared, whether or not there has been an “obvious error” with respect to the identity of the requested individual and whether it is clear that the individual could not have participated in the acts of which he/she is accused. However, the indictment division, pursuant to a general principle of French extradition law, may not assess whether or not prosecution is founded or if all of the charges are sufficient. 4.10The indictment division then issues a ruling that may, if it is favourable, be accompanied by reservations or be partially favourable. If the opinion is unfavourable, it is final. Any review that the Court of Cassation may later conduct relates solely to the procedure and the rules governing the procedure. 4.11On the basis of a favourable ruling by the indictment division, the Government adopts, when necessary, an extradition decree, which is subject to appeal before the Council of State, which monitors “procedural irregularities of the extradition decree and … the legality of the extradition measure in domestic law in the light of international law and international conventions, in order to verify whether, particularly after the indictment division has examined the case, the Government had been able to decide legally that conditions for extradition, for the offences involved, had been met”. The State party emphasizes that it was in this context that, on 15 February 1999, the Council of State annulled an extradition decision on the grounds of a breach of article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 4.12With regard to the complainant’s allegations that Mr. Azurmendi’s statements had been obtained as a result of torture, the indictment division decided that “while it is true that Azurmendi implicated [P.E.], he did so not under duress but, as indicated in the evidence submitted by the requesting State, on Civil Guard premises, in the presence of a lawyer”. For its part, the Council of State, on the basis of the same evidence, considered that those allegations had not been accompanied by any prima facie evidence. The Council of State also stressed “that it follows from the general principles of the law applicable to extradition that it is not up to the French authorities, except in the case of an obvious error, to rule on the correctness of the charges against the person claimed; that, in the case at hand, it does not appear that an obvious error has been committed both with respect to the offence of belonging to an armed group and with respect to the crime of complicity in attempted murder, of which Ms. [P.E.] has been accused”. 4.13The State party maintains that the State party’s obligation under article 15 of the Convention applies only if it is “established” that the statement in question had been obtained as a result of torture. The wording of this provision is very different from that of article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits a State party from returning or expelling a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she “would be in danger” of being subjected to torture. In the present case, the complainant has not established that Mr. Azurmendi’s statements were obtained as a result of torture, and the presence of a lawyer at his side during custody casts sufficiently serious doubt on those allegations. 4.14Moreover, the State party maintains that article 15 of the Convention in no way binds it to make inquiries of a third State in order to assess the validity of allegations of torture. With regard to extradition, it has never been accepted that a State should interfere in the course of adjudicatory proceedings taking place in a third country. The burden of proof can therefore fall only on the author of the allegations. 4.15Since the obligation contained in article 15 applies only to situations where it is established that a statement has been obtained as a result of torture, the proof can result from a sufficiently consistent body of circumstantial evidence. In the case at hand, it should be noted that the circumstantial evidence adduced by the complainant is tenuous. She refers to a consultation in a hospital following custody and Mr. Azurmendi’s retraction the next day before the examining magistrate. The complainant did not supply the least prima facie evidence of the deterioration of Mr. Azurmendi’s health during custody or of a causal link between the deterioration of his health and the physical abuse to which he was allegedly subjected. Mr. Azurmendi’s retraction before the examining magistrate may be explained by the fact that, at the time, he was not subjected to any pressure and that he therefore was able very quickly to diminish the significance of his previous statements. 4.16With regard to the presence of a court-appointed lawyer and the fact that Spanish legislation does not permit persons held in custody to choose their lawyer, the fact that the lawyer who was present when the statements were made was appointed by the court does not in itself constitute grounds for suspecting him of having seriously failed in his professional duty by not reporting, immediately or subsequently, that the statements had been obtained under torture. 4.17In addition to the fact that the complainant’s additional explanations concerning custody conditions in Spain are very general, the State party emphasizes that communications containing allegations similar to those made by the complainant have already been rejected by United Nations bodies. Thus, in opinion No. 26/1999 (see E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considered: “[I]ncommunicado detention, when justified by insuperable problems in the investigation of the offence concerned, especially when crimes as serious as terrorism are involved, cannot in itself be regarded as contrary to the Covenant. … The Group considers charges of terrorism and conspiracy to represent an exceptional circumstance which, according to Spanish legislation, authorizes incommunicado detention for a brief period. … The same may be said of the right to choose a legal counsel, to be assisted by counsel during the trial and to meet with counsel, as set forth in the above-mentioned Body of Principles, adopted by the General Assembly, by consensus, in l988. As Mikel Egibar did not ask to be interrogated in the presence of a lawyer of his own choosing and