proceeds to the examination of the merits of the case. 6.2With regard to the complainant’s claim under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether the author’s deportation to Spain violated the State party’s obligation under that article not to expel or return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In doing so, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations with a view to determining whether the person concerned is in personal danger, including the existence, in the State concerned, of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 6.3The Committee recalls that during the consideration of the fourth periodic report submitted by Spain under article 19 of the Convention, it noted with concern the dichotomy between the assertion of the Government that, isolated cases apart, torture and ill treatment do not occur in Spain, and the information received from non-governmental sources which is said to reveal instances of torture and ill-treatment by the State security and police forces.n It also expressed concern about the fact that incommunicado detention for up to a maximum of five days has been maintained for specific categories of particularly serious offences, given that during this period, the detainee has no access to a lawyer or to a doctor of his choice, nor is he/she able to contact his family.o The Committee considered that the incommunicado regime facilitates the commission of acts of torture and ill-treatment.p 6.4Notwithstanding the above, the Committee reiterates that its primary task is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his/her return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 6.5As to the complainant’s personal risk of being subjected to torture following extradition to Spain, the Committee has noted the complainant’s arguments that the Spanish extradition request was based on false accusations; that, as an ETA suspect, she was at a personal risk of being tortured during incommunicado detention, in the absence of access to a lawyer of her choice during that time; that other persons had been subjected to torture in circumstances that she considers to be similar to her case; and that consular protection by Germany as well as the prior designation of a lawyer constituted protection against possible abuse during incommunicado detention in theory only. It has equally noted the State party’s submission that, in addition to the above-mentioned protection, the international attention drawn to the complainant’s case, as well as the possibility for her to claim torture or ill-treatment by the Spanish authorities before the Committee and other international instances, constitute further guarantees preventing Spanish police from subjecting her to such treatment. 6.6Having regard to the complainant’s reference to the Committee’s views in the case of Josu Arkauz Arana, the Committee observes that the specific circumstances of that case, which led to the finding of a violation of article 3 of the Convention, differ markedly from the circumstances in the present case. The deportation of Josu Arkauz Arana “was effected under an administrative procedure, which the Administrative Court of Pau had later found to be illegal, entailing a direct handover from police to police, without the intervention of a judicial authority and without any possibility for the author to contact his family or his lawyer”.q By contrast, the complainant’s extradition to Spain was preceded by a judicial review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal of the decision of the Federal Office of Justice to grant the Spanish extradition request. The Committee notes that the judgement of the Federal Court, as well as the decision of the Federal Office, both contain an assessment of the risk of torture that the complainant would be exposed to following an extradition to Spain. The Committee, therefore, considers that, unlike in the case of Josu Arkauz Arana, the legal guarantees were sufficient, in the complainant’s case, to avoid placing her in a situation where she was particularly vulnerable to possible abuse by the Spanish authorities. 6.7The Committee observes that possible inconsistencies in the facts on which the Spanish extradition request was based cannot as such be construed as indicating any hypothetical intention of the Spanish authorities to inflict torture or ill-treatment on the complainant, once the extradition request was granted and executed. Insofar as the complainant claims that the State party’s decision to extradite her violated articles 3 and 9 of the European Convention on Extradition of 1957, the Committee observes that it is not competent ratione materiae to pronounce itself on the interpretation or application of that Convention. 6.8Lastly, the Committee notes that, subsequent to the complainant’s extradition to Spain, it has received no information on torture or ill-treatment suffered by the complainant during incommunicado detention. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee finds that the complainant’s extradition to Spain did not constitute a violation by the State party of article 3 of the Convention. 6.9With regard to the alleged violation of article 15 of the Convention, the Committee has noted the complainant’s arguments that, in granting the Spanish extradition request, which was, at least indirectly, based on testimony extracted by torture from Felipe San Epifanio, the State party itself had relied on this evidence, and that article 15 of the Convention applied not only to criminal proceedings against her in Spain, but also to the extradition proceedings before the Swiss Federal Office of Justice as well as the Federal Court. Similarly, the Committee has noted the State party’s submission that the admissibility of the relevant evidence was a matter to be decided by the Spanish courts. 6.10The Committee observes that the broad scope of the prohibition in article 15, proscribing the invocation of any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture as evidence “in any proceedings”, is a function of the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and implies, consequently, an obligation for each State party to ascertain whether or not statements admitted as evidence in any proceedings for which it has jurisdiction, including extradition proceedings, have been made as a result of torture.r 6.11At the same time, the Committee notes that, for the prohibition in article 15 to apply, it is required that the statement invoked as evidence be “established to have been made as a result of torture”. As the complainant herself stated, criminal proceedings initiated by Felipe San Epifanio against his alleged torturers were discontinued by the Spanish authorities. Considering that it is for the complainant to demonstrate that her allegations are well founded, the Committee concludes that, on the basis of the facts before it, it