a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention”.e Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed the issue in Osman v. United Kingdom and stated that: “article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. … [W]here there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person … it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk ... [H]aving regard to the nature of the right protected by article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge”.f 8.11The complainants further contend that the extent of the obligation to take preventive measures may increase with the immediacy of the risk to life. In support of this argument, they extensively rely on the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey where the Court laid down the obligations of States as follows: first, States have an obligation to take every reasonable step in order to prevent a real and immediate threat to the life and integrity of a person when the actions could be perpetrated by a person or group of persons with the consent or acquiescence of public authorities; second, States have an obligation to provide an effective remedy, including a proper and effective investigation, with regard to actions committed by non-State actors undertaken with the consent or acquiescence of public authorities.g 8.12The complainants also underline that the obligation of the States under the European Convention on Human Rights goes well beyond mere criminal sanctions for private individuals who have committed acts contrary to article 3 of the said Convention. In Z. et al. v. United Kingdom, the European Commission on Human Rights held that: “the authorities had been aware of the serious ill-treatment and neglect suffered by the children over a period of years at the hands of their parents and failed, despite the means reasonably available to them, to take any effective steps to bring it to an end. ... [The State had therefore] failed in its positive obligation under article 3 of the Convention to provide the applicants with adequate protection against inhuman and degrading treatment”.h 8.13In conclusion, the complainants submit that “they were indeed subjected to acts of community violence inflicting on them great physical and mental suffering amounting to torture and/or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment”. They further state that “this happened for the purpose of punishing them for an act committed by a third person (the rape of S.B.), and that the community violence (or rather the racist attack) at issue took place in the presence of, and thus with the ‘consent or acquiescence’ of, the police whose duty under law was precisely the opposite - to assume their safety and provide them protection”. 8.14Finally, concerning the absence of observations by the State party on the merits, the complainants refer to rule 108 (6) of the Committee’s rules of procedure and consider that such principle should be equally applicable during the phase of the merits. Relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Human Rights Committee, the complainants further argue that, by not contesting the facts or the legal arguments developed in the complaint and further submissions, the State party has tacitly accepted the claims at issue. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 9.1The Committee has considered the complaint in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. Moreover, in the absence of any submission from the State party following the Committee’s decision on admissibility, the Committee relies on the detailed submissions made by the complainants. The Committee recalls in this respect that a State party has an obligation under article 22, paragraph 3, of the Convention to cooperate with the Committee and to submit written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been granted. 9.2As to the legal qualification of the facts that have occurred on 15 April 1995, as they were described by the complainants, the Committee first considers that the burning and destruction of houses constitute, in the circumstances, acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The nature of these acts is further aggravated by the fact that some of the complainants were still hidden in the settlement when the houses were burnt and destroyed, the particular vulnerability of the alleged victims and the fact that the acts were committed with a significant level of racial motivation. Moreover, the Committee considers that the complainants have sufficiently demonstrated that the police (public officials), although they had been informed of the immediate risk that the complainants were facing and had been present at the scene of the events, did not take any appropriate steps in order to protect the complainants, thus implying “acquiescence” in the sense of article 16 of the Convention. In this respect, the Committee has reiterated on many instances its concerns about “inaction by police and law enforcement officials who fail to provide adequate protection against racially motivated attacks when such groups have been threatened”.i Although the acts referred to by the complainants were not committed by public officials themselves, the Committee considers that they were committed with their acquiescence and therefore constitute a violation of article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention by the State party. 9.3Having considered that the facts described by the complainants constitute acts within the meaning of article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention, the Committee will analyse other alleged violations in the light of that finding.