CCPR/C/120/D/2532/2015 investigator in the Vakhitovsky District Court of Kazan, which was rejected on 27 February 2010, and with the Prosecutor’s office. The Committee notes that on 25 December 2009 the author attempted to raise the issue of substantive violations in the pretrial detention with the trial court and requested the court to issue a special ruling against the acts of the investigator, and that that request was rejected.20 The Committee also notes that the author complained about the alleged torture against him in his request for a supervisory review before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Committee finds it is not prevented by the requirements of article 3 of the Optional Protocol from examining the present claim. 10.4 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he has exhausted all effective domestic remedies available to him. It also notes the State party’s claim that the investigation is ongoing. However, the Committee observes that more than 7 years have passed since on 27 February 2010, when the Vakhitovsky District Court of Kazan rejected without consideration first motion filed by the author to open a criminal case against two investigators, “K.” and “Sh.”, and that more than five years have passed since 28 August 2011, when the Department of Internal Affairs of Kazan gave its first decision not to open a criminal case against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the author. During that time, the author has continued to submit motions, which have been rejected by the Office of the Prosecutor of Tatarstan and by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The Committee observes that the application of remedies has been unreasonably prolonged and, therefore, considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met. 10.5 The Committee notes the author’s claims under article 14 (1) of the Covenant in relation to the examination of evidence and of witnesses during the trial. In particular, it observes the author’s disagreement with the sentence against him, the assessment of his alibi and material evidence, and the status of the defence witnesses and their statements. In that regard, the Committee notes, from the information on the file, that the judge had applied domestic law in examining the evidence and witnesses in question. The Committee recalls that it is generally for the courts of the State party to the Covenant to review facts and evidence or to apply domestic legislation, unless it can be shown that such evaluation or application is clearly arbitrary or amounts to a manifest error or denial of justice, or that the court has otherwise violated its obligation of independence and impartiality. 21 In the present case, the Committee observes that the material before it does not allow it to conclude that the examination of the evidence and questioning of witnesses by the court reached the threshold for arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence, or amounted to a denial of justice. The Committee therefore declares this part of the communication insufficiently substantiated and inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.6 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he was not allowed to present arguments in person before the court and thus his right to defence has been violated. However, the Committee notes that the author was present and represented by a private lawyer through the judicial proceedings, was informed about his procedural rights and did not request to take part in person in the judicial debate, and that his defence counsel presented legal arguments and the author was given the last retort. Accordingly, the Committee finds this part of the author’s claim under article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.7 The Committee considers that the facts of the communication also raise issues under article 7 of the Covenant, read in conjunction with article 2 (3). The Committee declares 20 21 The transcript of the court hearing does not indicate that any assessment of the claims was made before the court rejected the request. See, inter alia, communications No. 1188/2003, Riedl-Riedenstein et al. v. Germany, decision on inadmissibility adopted on 2 November 2004, para. 7.3; No. 1138/2002, Arenz et al. v. Germany, decision on inadmissibility adopted on 24 March 2004, para. 8.6; and No. 2125/2011, Tyan v. Kazakhstan, Views adopted on 16 March 2017, para. 8.10. See also the Committee’s general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, para. 26. 9