II.  REQUIREMENTS, LIMITATIONS AND EFFECTS OF THE CONCURRENT APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT The lex specialis derogat legi generali principle reflects a widely accepted maxim of legal interpretation and technique for the resolution of normative conflicts. It establishes that, if a matter is being regulated by a general standard and at the same time by a more specific rule, then the latter should take precedence over the former. The relationship between the general standard and the specific rule may, however, be conceived in two ways. One is where the specific rule should be read and understood within the confines or against the background of the general standard, typically as an elaboration, update or technical specification of the latter. From a narrower perspective, lex specialis is also understood to cover the case where two legal provisions that are both valid and applicable are in no express hierarchical relationship and provide incompatible direction on how to deal with the same set of facts. In such a case, the application of the lex specialis principle is used to resolve conflicts of norms. In both cases, however, the rule with a more precisely delimited scope of application has priority.86 The principle of lex specialis has sometimes been misunderstood and overstated in the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. First, as indicated above, the number of concrete situations in which international human rights law and international humanitarian law yield different results is small compared to the number of situations in which both provide similar protections. In these cases, the principle of lex specialis does not have any particular role. In this respect, the International Law Commission has indicated that “for the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other.”87 Second, as recalled by the International Law Commission, the principle of lex specialis applies to provisions that, when used in the context of   See “Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law – Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission” (A/CN.4/L.682, paras. 56–57). 87   Draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, commentary to article 55. 86 59