II.  REQUIREMENTS, LIMITATIONS AND EFFECTS OF THE CONCURRENT APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT conflicts in which one or more States have recourse to armed force against another State. The commentary to the Geneva Conventions provides further guidance when it indicates that “any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.”34 Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has stated that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”.35 One of the problems of the lack of a clear definition is that, for example, it is uncertain whether international humanitarian law would apply in low-intensity military confrontation, such as border incidents or armed skirmishes. International law does not provide guidance on the precise meaning of “use of force” or “armed conflict” in the context of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Geneva Conventions. While some claim that every act of armed violence between two States is covered by international humanitarian law of international armed conflicts, others consider that a threshold of intensity should be applied.36 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, it is important to remember that, irrespective of the existence of an actual armed conflict, international human rights law continues to apply. As the hostilities unfold, international humanitarian law will be triggered and its protections and standards will complement, complete and in certain cases further clarify international human rights protections, guarantees and minimum standards.   Jean Pictet et al., eds., Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field: Commentary (Geneva, ICRC, 1952), p. 32. 35   Prosecutor v. Duško Tadi’c, case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70. 36   See, in this respect, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s decision on Tadi’c’s defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, where the Appeals Chamber indicates that hostilities in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992 “exceed the intensity requirements applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts.” Ibid. 34 35