CCPR/C/125/D/2494/2014 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s initial claim that returning him to the Islamic Republic of Iran would expose him to a risk of irreparable harm, in violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. He alleges that he would face persecution by the Iranian authorities because he converted from Islam to Christianity. However, the Committee notes that since his deportation to the Islamic Republic of Iran on 30 July 2014, the author has not provided any further information as to any violation of the Covenant arising precisely after and owing to his deportation. Moreover, given that the author’s complaint before the Committee revolves around his conversion, the Committee will not examine the author’s allegations before the Danish authorities in connection with his alleged activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. 8.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (para. 12). The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 25 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 26 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 27 8.4 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists,28 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.29 8.5 The Committee notes the finding of the Refugee Appeals Board that the author failed to substantiate his claim that his conversion was genuine, despite the existence of a certificate of baptism. In that connection, the Committee observes the finding of the State party that, other than his certificate of baptism, the author has not provided any information or evidence, either to the Danish authorities, or to the Committee, to substantiate his claim. The Committee also notes that, based on this limited information, the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the author’s asylum case. 8.6 In that regard, the Committee considers that when an asylum seeker submits that he or she has converted to another religion after his or her initial asylum request has been dismissed in the country of asylum, it may be reasonable for the States parties to conduct an in-depth examination of the circumstances of the conversion.30 However, the test for the Committee remains whether, regardless of the sincerity of the conversion, there are substantial grounds for believing that conversion may have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin such as to create a real risk of irreparable harm, as contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Therefore, even when it is found that the reported conversion is not sincere, the authorities should proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the asylum seeker’s behaviour and activities in connection with, or to justify, his or her conversion, such as attending a church, being baptized or participating in proselytizing activities, could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin such as to put him or her at risk of irreparable harm. 31 8.7 In the present case, the Committee observes that the only information produced by the author in support of his conversion was a certificate of baptism dated 6 June 2013, which referred to his baptism having taken place on 23 November 2012. However, the 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 10 See K. v. Denmark, para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark, para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. See X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. Ibid. See also X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. See Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4, and Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, for example, K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on international protection: religion-based refugee claims under article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees”, para. 34. See S.A.H. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/121/D/2419/2014), para. 11.8, and F.G. v. Sweden, para. 156.