CEDAW/C/73/D/102/2016 have a child, and she requested her gynaecologist to “untie the tubes”. 1 The gynaecologist explained for the first time that she could not have children. This was not specified in the surgery documentation, and C. claims that no one in the hospital provided any information to that effect. The medical documentation contains her signature on blank paper with a statement reading “I agree with a surgery”. On the reverse side of the decision of the sterilization committee, it is mentioned that the committee approved the sterilization because she already had three chil dren and because of her Roma ethnicity. 2.7 No remedy in domestic law exists for victims of forced sterilization. A person who has undergone an unlawful medical intervention can seek redress through an action for the protection of “personal rights”. However, the statute of limitations makes it impossible for women to seek an effective remedy and to request monetary compensation. The general statute of limitations for civil claims is three years. 2 In cases concerning the right to life, dignity, name, health, privacy or other personal rights, the Civil Code specifies that it is still possible to bring a claim after the time limit has expired, but restricts the right to seek monetary compensation. 3 The law does not specify, but the courts have confirmed, that victims of such violations can seek non-monetary compensation (an apology) if they bring their claim after the time limit has expired. It is therefore possible for the authors to make a civil claim and seek an apology. For a period of time, it appeared that victims of forced sterilization might be able to claim compensation even if they brought their claims after the time limit had expired, despite the provision in the Civil Code. The case law was inconsistent on this point, even at the highest judicial level. At one point, the Supreme Court interpreted the provision as allowing people in such circumstances to claim monetary compensation. 4 That judgment was overruled by the Supreme Court Grand Chamber. 5 The latter interpretation was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 2013, which found that the Civil Code did indeed prevent victims of forced sterilization from claiming monetary compensation if they brought their claims for violations of personal rights after the time limit had expired, unless such a restriction would be contrary to “good morals”/“bonnes moeurs” (dobré mravy).6 2.8 The law does not explicitly define the notion of “good morals”/“bonnes moeurs”. This notion may be applied in cases in which the fact that the limitation period has expired is not the fault of the complainant, e.g., when a woman learns that she has been sterilized after the three-year period has elapsed. However, she must bring the action to court within three years from the time she learned that she had been sterilized. 2.9 The authors were not in a position to bring a claim for compensation immediately following the sterilization. They did not fully understand what had happened to them and, during communist rule, it was unheard of for someone to bring such a legal claim. Some cannot name a particular date after which they “knew” they had been sterilized; for the last author, the realization came seven years after the fact. By the time they were in a position to understand and explain what had happened at a sufficient level to formulate a claim for compensation and received legal advice on how to bring the claim, it was far too late under the statute of limitations. 2.10 Some of the cases of forced sterilization occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party. However, the authors argue that this does __________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 4/18 Terms used by the social worker. Czech Republic, Civil Code, Law No. 89/2012 of 3 February 2012, Book One, sect. 629. Ibid., sect. 612. Czech Republic, Supreme Court, Case No. 30 Cdo 1542/2003, judgment of 25 September 2003. Czech Republic, Supreme Court, Case No. 31 Cdo 3161/2008, judgment of 12 November 2008. Czech Republic, Constitutional Court, Case No. II, ÚS 7/13, judgment of 17 January 2013. 19-15443