CEDAW/C/73/D/102/2016 force internationally. 27 The time factor plays an important role in considering the ratione temporis admissibility. The lapse of time between the triggering event and the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party should not be unreasonably long. 28 The lapse of time between the sterilization of the authors and the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party should be taken into consideration and even when an act, omission or decision has “enduring effects [it] does not give a rise to a continuing situation”.29 4.10 The communication is inadmissible for incompatibility ratione temporis concerning all authors except J.D. In A.S. v. Hungary, the author complained about the fact that she had been “subjected to coerced sterilization by medical staff at a Hungarian hospital” 30 and not about the alleged lack of domestic remedies. The present communication is limited to an alleged violation of the right to remedy, which cannot be considered “of continuous nature” without any time limitations, in the light of the fundamental principle of legal certainty. 31 4.11 The Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 26 February 2001. For the purposes of individual communications, the Committee has temporal jurisdiction to examine the existence of effective remedies at the domestic level only after that date. This marks the material time for the purposes of the present case. 4.12 In its 2010 concluding observations, the Committee recommended that the limitation period for bringing compensation claims in sterilization cases should start “from the time of discovery of the real significance and all consequences of the sterilization by the victim”. For the purposes of ratione temporis considerations and in the light of the above, it is imperative to ascertain when B., F., M., C. and G. discovered “the real significance and all consequences” of their sterilization. The starting point must be the actual dates of their sterilization. It appears that they were sterilized in 1982, 1987, 1987, 1989 and 1990, respectively. G. discovered “all consequences” soon after she was sterilized, on 25 September 1990 at the latest. C. claims that she became aware of the full consequences seven years after the surgery, in 1996. These two authors discovered “the real significance and all consequences” of their sterilization long before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol. 4.13 Concerning B., F. and M., there is no evidence suggesting when they discovered “the real significance and all consequences” of their sterilization. They remained silent on this point. Nevertheless, given that all three authors were sterilized in the 1980s, no less than 12 years before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, the State party can reasonably expect that they discovered the “real significance and all consequences” long before 2001. It can reasonably be assumed that the authors had the medical documentation when leaving the hospital and knew that they could not have children because of their sterilization. Regular gynaecological check-ups are a common and free health-care service available in the State party. The passage of time must have uncovered “the real significance and all consequences” of their sterilization. 4.14 In sum, B., F., M. and G. became fully aware of their sterilization long before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, most likely in the __________________ 27 28 29 30 31 19-15443 Cristina Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña v. Spain (CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005), para. 11.5. European Court of Human Rights, Janowiec and Others v. Russia, application Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, judgment of 21 October 2013, para. 146. European Court of Human Rights, Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia, application No. 37780/02, judgment of 27 May 2008; X. v. United Kingdom, application No. 7379/76, Commission decision of 10 December 1977. A.S. v. Hungary, para. 1.1. Dayras and Others v. France (CEDAW/C/44/D/13/2007), para. 10.10. 9/18