The complaint 3.1 The complainant claims that due to his involvement with Al-Nadha, the fact that he was previously arrested and interrogated by the Tunisian authorities, and the existence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to Tunisia and, therefore, Sweden would be violating article 3 of the Convention if he were returned there. 3.2 The complainant states that the Immigration Board’s decision not to grant him asylum was based on an incorrect assessment of the evidence before it and that very important information provided by the complainant, including the letters from the Chairman of Al-Nadha, the letter from UNHCR and information from Amnesty International, all of which specifically referred to the risk that the complainant would be subjected to torture, were not taken into account in forming its decision. The State party’s observations on admissibility and merits and the complainant’s comments thereon 4.1 The State party raises no objection to the admissibility of the petition. On 8 October 2001, the State party submitted its comments on the merits of the petition. The State party explains that when the Immigration Board rejected the complainant’s application for asylum and a residence permit, it also ordered his expulsion either to Tunisia or to Saudi Arabia. 4.2 The State party submits that it is primarily upon the complainant to collect and present evidence in support of his claim.1 Furthermore, it is of the view that the competent national authority conducting the asylum hearing is in the best position to judge the general veracity of the complainant’s case and consequently great importance must be attached to its assessment. The State party submits that the complainant has not substantiated his claim that he would run a personal, real and foreseeable risk of being tortured if returned to Tunisia. 4.3 On the complainant’s claim to have been intimated by the police on account of his political and religious beliefs in 1989, 1990 and 1992, the State party submits that neither of the incidents in 1989 or 1990 prevented his from returning to the country. Yet the incident in 1989 appears to have entailed the most serious violation of his rights. The State party highlights that in this regard the complainant has provided no details of the abuse, no information about the possible after-effects and no evidence to support his claim, and refers in this connection to the Committee’s general comment on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention.2 The State party also adds that although the complainant was already at this time accused, inter alia, of providing financial support to families of persons imprisoned for activities against the regime, he was never convicted as a result of the allegations made against him. On the contrary, and according to the complainant himself, in 1989 the court issued a certificate stating that he was not wanted by the authorities. The State party submits that with regard to the two other occasions when the complainant claims to have been interrogated, he makes no claim of being tortured, and in this regard the State party notes that a risk of detention is not sufficient to justify the protection of article 3 of the Convention, and refers to I.A.O. v. Sweden.3 5