OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Seimas Ombudsmen 26. Aside from the overall status and structure of the Ombudsmen and their Office respectively, it is noted that the Law does not provide for any form of immunity for the Ombudsmen and their staff from prosecution and other court proceedings for actions and statements related to their work and mandates. Such immunity is necessary to ensure that the Ombudsmen and their staff are able to conduct their work properly and without fear of time-consuming, possibly politically-motivated lawsuits. Such an immunity clause would constitute a further guarantee of the Ombudsmen’s independence and impartiality in all cases before them. It should cover not only statements and documents, but also baggage, all correspondence, and means of communication belonging to the Ombudsmen and their staff. 3. Definitions and Terminology 27. Article 2 contains definitions of certain terms used in the Law, namely the terms “bureaucracy”, “official”, “complainant” and “abuse of office”. 28. Under Article 2 par 1, bureaucracy involves actions of public officials who do not deal with a matter based on its merits, but rather “[observe] unnecessary or invented formalities” or “unreasonably [refuse] to settle issues within [their] jurisdiction or [delay] decision-making or carrying out of official duties”. Malfeasance or misfeasance in office (refusal to inform a person of his/her rights, deliberately misleading advice, etc) is also considered to be “bureaucracy”, as is officials’ failure to implement or properly implement laws or other legal acts. 29. The said definition of bureaucracy appears to be quite detailed, and covers numerous actions on the side of public officials. While certain inaccuracies may also stem from translation errors, it is noted that numerous aspects of this definition would appear to be quite difficult to determine in practice, e.g. whether formalities are unnecessary or invented in a given case, or whether a refusal to settle an issue is unreasonable, or indeed whether misleading advice was actually given deliberately. In keeping with the general tenor of the Law, this term is too focused on the wrongdoing of individuals, and does not cover possible human rights violations or malfeasance/misfeasance of entire parts of an administration. As stated above (see pars 23-24 supra), the task of an Ombudsperson should be to generally ensure good administration, and not to pinpoint individual malfeasance without trying to reform the system. It is thus recommended to delete the definition of bureaucracy in Article 2 par 1, and all further references to this term in the Law, as well as the definition of abuse of office under Article 2 par 4, which also presupposes acts or omissions of officials for “self-seeking purposes” or for other personal considerations. At the very least, both terms (“bureaucracy” and “abuse of power”) should be merged into one definition of abuse of power, as this term would appear to cover what is now defined as bureaucracy (deliberate or negligent failure to implement the Law or to fulfill one’s duty as a public official). 30. Should it still be considered necessary to include such a definition for abuse of office, then it should be simplified to cover all cases where public officials make use of the powers granted to them in a manner that violates administrative legislation or the civil servants’ code of ethics. Cases of excess of power should be treated separately and should not be defined as abuse of power, as they do not concern cases where existing power is abused, but rather cases where an official pretends to have powers that he/she actually does not have. 11