CCPR/C/121/D/2471/2014 8.4 The Committee notes the State party’s observation that the present communication was registered in violation of the provisions of the Optional Protocol, in particular because it seems that the author did not authorize his wife to submit a complaint on his behalf and because the identity of the contact person indicated for correspondence purposes is unclear. In this regard, the Committee recalls its practice, as reflected in rule 96 (b) of its rules of procedure, that individuals may be represented by a duly authorized person of their choice. A communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim may, however, be accepted when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally. Implicit in a State’s adherence to the Optional Protocol is the undertaking to cooperate with the Committee in good faith so as to permit and enable it to consider such communications, and after examination thereof, to forward its Views to the State party and the individual (art. 5 (1) and (4)).3 It is incompatible with those obligations for a State party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the Committee in its consideration and examination of a communication, and in the expression of its Views. 4 It is for the Committee to determine whether a communication should be registered. The Committee observes that, by refusing the right of an individual to be represented, by failing to accept the competence of the Committee to determine whether a communication should be registered and by declaring beforehand that it will not accept the Committee’s determination on the admissibility or on the merits of the communication, the State party would be violating its obligations under article 1 of the Optional Protocol. 8.5 The Committee takes note of the author’s claim under article 18, read in conjunction with articles 6, 7, and 14 (1) and (2) of the Covenant, that, if expelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran, he would be at risk of torture and execution due to his conversion to Christianity in 2002. In this regard, the Committee notes that the author has not provided supporting documents demonstrating that the Iranian authorities are aware of his conversion. Noting also that, with regard to his previous trips to and extended stay in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2009 to 2011 and 2012, the author has not reported encountering any problems related to his conversion, the Committee finds this claim to be insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8.6 The Committee notes the author’s claim that his family life would be affected were he to be expelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran. From the information before it, the Committee notes that, while he had raised this issue in his initial asylum application to the Department of Citizenship and Migration on 16 August 2013, he did not raise it before the appeal and cassation courts. The Committee considers that the author has not exhausted all available domestic remedies concerning his claim under articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant and finds it inadmissible under article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 8.7 As to the remainder of the communication, the Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author has not exhausted all the effective domestic remedies, since he has not filed request for supervisory review with the President of Minsk City Court, the President of the Supreme Court and his or her deputies, or the Prosecutor General and his or her deputies. The Committee considers that filing a request for supervisory review with the President of a court with regard to a court decision that has entered into force constitutes an extraordinary remedy, which would depend on the discretionary powers of a judge, and the State party would have to show that there is a reasonable prospect that such a request would result in an effective remedy in the circumstances of the case. 5 The Committee takes note of the statistics provided by the State party on a number of requests filed for supervisory review upheld by the Supreme Court (para 6.3 above). It notes, however, that these statistics do not specify whether and in how many cases the requests for supervisory review filed with the President of the Supreme Court were successful in cases similar to the present one. In such circumstances, the Committee finds that article 5 (2) (b) 3 4 5 6 See, mutatis mutandis, communication No. 1929/2010, Lozenko v. Belarus, Views adopted on 24 October 2014, para. 5.2. See, inter alia, communications No. 869/1999, Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines, Views adopted on 19 October 2000, para. 5.1; and No. 1948/2010, Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, Views adopted on 24 July 2013, para. 5.2. See, for example, communication No. 2030/2011, Poliakov v. Belarus, Views adopted on 17 July 2014, para. 7.3.