48 GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON TORTURE: Law and Practice private actor (a former common law husband) against his former wife. The Committee highlighted the State’s failure to provide adequate redress for the woman, as there were no women’s shelters that had adequate facilities for her and her disabled child to flee from her husband’s continued vio­ lence (four years). The Committee also pointed to the State’s failure to take the husband, who had beaten his wife so badly she had to be hospitalized, into custody, although he repeatedly attacked her at her home and was, at the time, subject to criminal proceedings. As Rudolf and Eriksson rightly point out, the Committee “based its understanding of the situation . . . on the prohibition of gender discrimination seen as the state’s obligation to ensure effective equality,” (2007, p. 522; see also Reddy, 2016, pp. 505-508) but not the State’s international jus cogens obligation to prevent violence against women. In other words, the Committee’s main emphasis is on the elimination of discrimination, not ending violence against women. Nevertheless, there is room, as demonstrated in the case, for violence against women to be read into the equality standard. For instance, at the time, Hungary admitted that its domestic laws were inadequate and in the process of being re-writ­ ten, most likely as a consequence of accession to the European Union (EU). However, it is not nec­ essarily that ‘easy’ in other situations, such as the Canadian example which this paper describes, and therefore certainly needs to be treated with caution for other more challenging situations. It is also the case that the individual petition procedure is onerous on the person suffering the discrim­ ination and violence. It is not a systemic, transformative solution (see generally Fredman, 2008). Rather, it permits the State to ‘wait and see’ if someone will make a complaint, instead of fulfilling its positive obligations under international law where it knows the violence is occurring. In other words, the jurisprudence of the Committee to date is growing, but not yet developed enough to fill the normative gap. Alongside its judgments, the CEDAW Committee has issued several recommendations that are relevant to addressing violence against women. This includes General Recommendations 12 (1989) and 19 (1992). Both recognize the family as a site for violence against women. Indeed, these General Recommendations constitute a blueprint (in part) for any new global instrument. General Recommendation 19 provides an interpretation that is vital as an underpinning of any possible treaty, as it interprets violence against women and girls as a form of discrimination against them, meaning “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (para. 6). It expounds on the types of violations that constitute discrimina­ tion, including the right not to be subjected to torture, that would impair or nullify the enjoy­ ment by women of their human rights under general international law and conventions (para. 7). Paragraphs 8 and 9 clarify that the Recommendation is not only applicable to State actors, but also to non-State actors. Additionally, the DEVAW, ratified in 1993, provides a comprehensive framework in terms of definition, scope, and State obligations to act with due diligence, and highlights the role of the United Nations in the effort to eliminate violence against women. The DEVAW has formed the basis for numerous subsequent resolutions and, as such, has served the purpose of drawing the international community’s attention to gender-based violence. Other organs of the United Nations aside from the CEDAW Committee and the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW, outcome documents, agreed conclusions, etc.) have for many years recognized violence against women, whether perpetrated in private or public, as a violation of human rights. Despite numerous doc­ uments and instruments, including the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions; the work of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; General Comments of both the Human Rights Council and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;