CAT/C/53/D/520/2012 rather than on a legal basis, and is thus ex gratia in nature. Based on those considerations, the Committee concludes that, in the present case, the complainant’s failure to exhaust that remedy does not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the complaint. 22 7.5 The Committee considers the author’s claim, which raises issues under article 3 of the Covenant, to be sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, declares it admissible and proceeds to its examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 In accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, the Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all information made available to it by the parties concerned. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainant to Ethiopia would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (refouler) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to his country of origin. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of the evaluation is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 on the implementation of article 3, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable”,23 the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he faces a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk.24 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, under article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 25 8.5 The complainant claims that in Ethiopia she may be tortured or even killed because of her ethnic origin and her perceived involvement with the OLF; her past arrest; the 22 23 24 25 12 See for example communication No. 343/2008, Kalonzo v. Canada, (see footnote 11), para. 8.3. See footnote 11. Ibid. See also communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. The Netherlands, decision of 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. See, inter alia, communication No. 466/2011, Alp v. Denmark, decision of 14 May 2014, para. 8.3.