CRPD/C/25/D/58/2019 5.2 The author argues that articles 10 and 15 of the Convention should be interpreted in such a way that they encompass non-refoulement cases in view of the fact that persons with disabilities constitute a particularly vulnerable group. In this connection, he submits that the principle of non-refoulement under the Convention should be construed not only in the light of article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but also article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9 and article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights,10 as the wording of the latter provisions, similar to that of article 15 of the Convention, provides protection not only against torture but also against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 5.3 With regard to the claims raised under articles 12 and 13 of the Convention, the author notes that fair trial rights in expulsion cases are an integral part of the principle of nonrefoulement. Considering that the Committee has yet to decide on cases similar to the present case, it may well be that these rights will be considered to be part of the protection guaranteed under articles 10 and 15 of the Convention. In that case, the author has no objection to the Committee examining his arguments only under articles 10 and 15 of the Convention. 5.4 In addition, the author contests the State party’s position that the European Court of Human Rights had examined his case on the merits. He submits that that conclusion is based on mere speculation. 5.5 Responding to the State party’s position that his claims are insufficiently substantiated, the author maintains that the asylum proceedings were not adapted to his disabilities and the fact that he was able to present his case does not mean that he was able to present it to the best of his ability. He further contests the State party’s statement that the national authorities were able to make a well-informed decision solely on the basis of his symptoms, which ignored his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. The author submits that treatments are dependent on the diagnosis, even if the symptoms are the same. Therefore, his additional diagnosis should have been of key importance in the assessment of his asylum claim and the failure to take it into account amounts to a violation of his rights under the Convention. State party’s observations on the merits 6.1 In a note verbale dated 13 March 2020, the State party submitted its observations on the merits. Moreover, in addition to the grounds for inadmissibility invoked in its observations dated 2 November 2018, the State party holds that the complaint relating to articles 12 and 13 of the Convention should be declared inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 6.2 The State party provides information on the pertinent domestic legislation and notes that a residence permit may be issued under chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act in cases where an overall assessment of the person’s situation reveals such exceptionally distressing circumstances that he or she should be allowed to stay in the State party. In making this assessment, particular attention is to be paid to the person’s state of health, their adaptation to the State party and the situation in their country of origin. One ground for a residence permit in these circumstances is that the person in question has a life-threatening somatic or mental illness or suffers from a particularly serious disability. The State party notes that, in order to grant a residence permit on grounds of mental ill health, a medical examination must support the view that the individual’s mental health condition is sufficiently severe that it could be regarded as life-threatening. Regarding a claim of suicide risk, the starting point is that each individual is primarily responsible for his or her own life and actions. In some cases, however, serious self-destructive acts or statements of intent to carry out such acts by a seriously and non-temporarily mentally disturbed person have led to residence permits being granted. In such cases, the Migration Agency has assessed the extent to which these selfdestructive acts or statements of intent to carry out such acts have been made because of severe mental ill-health, as recognized in a psychiatric examination. 9 10 6 The author refers to C. v. Australia (CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999). The author refers to European Court of Human Rights, D. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997, and N. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 26565/05, Judgment of 27 May 2008.