CCPR/C/117/D/2387/2014 human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.25 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it can be established that the assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 26 8.4 While noting the author’s assertions about his family profile, killing of his relatives, the absence of clan protection, his Western identity and appearance, his lack of local knowledge, experience and support networks in Somalia, the Committee observes that the author’s claims were thoroughly examined by the State party’s authorities in the context of his pre-removal risk assessment application and the danger opinion issued by the Minister’s delegate on 15 June 2012. The Minister’s delegate found that the general human rights abuses and poor country conditions were not sufficient to establish that the author would be personally at risk if returned to Somalia. She also found that the author posed a danger to the Canadian public owing to “serious criminality”. 8.5 The Committee notes that, although the author contests the assessment and finding of the Minister’s delegate as to the risk of harm he faces in Somalia, he has not presented any new evidence to substantiate his allegations under articles 6 and 7. The Committee considers that the information available demonstrates that the State party took into account all the elements available to evaluate the risk faced by the author, and that the author has not identified any irregularity in the decision-making process. The Committee also considers that, while the author disagrees with the factual conclusions of the State party’s authorities, he has not shown that they were arbitrary or manifestly erroneous, or amounted to a denial of justice. In view thereof, the Committee is not able to conclude that the information before it shows that the author’s rights under articles 6 (1) and 7 of the Covenant would be violated if he were removed to Somalia. Articles 17 and 23 (1) 8.6 As to the alleged violation under articles 17 and 23 (1), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3), the Committee reiterates its jurisprudence that there may be cases in which a State party’s refusal to allow one member of a family to remain on its territory would involve interference in that person’s family life. However, the mere fact that certain members of the family are entitled to remain on the territory of a State party does not necessarily mean that requiring other members of the family to leave involves such interference.27 The Committee recalls its general comments No. 16 (1988) on the right to privacy and No. 19 (1990) on the family, according to which the concept of the family is to be interpreted broadly. It also recalls that the separation of a person from his family by means of expulsion can amount to arbitrary interference with the family and a violation of article 17 if, in the circumstances of the case, the separation of the author from his family and its effects on him would be disproportionate to the objectives of the removal. 28 8.7 In the present case, the Committee considers that the author’s deportation to Somalia would constitute “interference” with his family relations in Canada, within the meaning of article 17 of the Covenant. The Committee therefore must examine if that interference could be considered either arbitrary or unlawful. The Committee recalls that the notion of arbitrariness includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law,29 as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. 30 The Committee also recalls that the relevant criteria for assessing whether or not the specific interference with family life can be objectively justified must be considered in the light, on 25 26 27 28 29 30 12 See X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; and communication No. 1833/2008, X v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See, for example, K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4. See, for example, communications No. 930/2000, Winata et al. v. Australia, Views adopted on 26 July 2001, paragraph 7.1; No. 1011/2001, Madafferi et al. v. Australia, Views adopted on 26 July 2004, para. 9.7; No. 1222/2003, Byahuranga v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 November 2004, para. 11.5; and Dauphin v. Canada, para. 8.1. See communication No. 558/1993, Canepa v. Canada, Views adopted on 3 April 1997, para. 11.4. See, for example, communication No. 2009/2010, Ilyasov v. Kazakhstan, Views adopted on 23 July 2014, para. 7.4. See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 12. GE.17-03930