CAT/C/57/D/628/2014 the complainant lacked credibility. In this connection, the State party also refers to the pertinent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 4.7 The State party further notes the case of X, Y and Z v. Sweden,4 in which the Committee observed that “past torture is one of the elements to be taken into account by the Committee when examining a claim concerning article 3 of the Convention, but that the aim of the Committee’s examination of the communication is to find whether the authors would risk being subjected to torture now, if returned [to the country of origin]”. In this regard, it also notes the case of M.C.M.V.F. v. Sweden,5 in which the Committee noted that the crucial point was the situation in the country of origin at the time of the potential return of the asylum seeker to that country. 4.8 The State party further recalls the facts of the case and adds that at the national level the complainant claimed that his sons had been forced to undertake a 15-day training by LTTE in 2006, not in 2004 as stated by him before the Committee. It also notes that, contrary to what the complainant claims, the Human Rights Commission in Sri Lanka did not provide any information whatsoever. The State party further maintains that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility of his complaint under article 3 of the Convention, as it has not been sufficiently substantiated that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to Sri Lanka. The complaint is therefore manifestly unfounded and should be declared inadmissible. Should the Committee find the complaint admissible, the State party submits that the complainant has not sufficiently established that his return to Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention. 4.9 The State party observes that no new information has been provided in the complainant’s communication to the Committee on his or his son’s problems in Sri Lanka. It notes that, according to the practice of the Refugee Appeals Board, the fact that an asylum seeker has been subjected to torture in his country of origin does not lead to the granting of asylum or protection status in all cases. The decisive factor in an assessment is whether the respective asylum seeker is at risk of torture upon return to his country of origin. In this connection, the State party observes that, in its decision of 13 March 2012, the Refugee Appeals Board essentially found the complainant’s statement as fact but, in view of the background information concerning the change in the situation in Sri Lanka after the complainant’s departure in November 2008, including the fact that EPDP had ceased to be an element of the policy of the Government of Sri Lanka, the Board found that the complainant would not risk being subjected to persecution or ill-treatment within the meaning of section 7 of the Aliens Act upon return. Even though the complainant satisfied the conditions for being granted residence under section 7 of the Aliens Act at the time of his departure in November 2008, that does not mean that he would automatically be eligible for residence under this provision at the time when the Danish Immigration Service or the Refugee Appeals Board rendered the decision, given that the conditions for residence were no longer met and had ceased to exist. In other words, the basis for the assessment of whether an alien is at risk of persecution or abuse justifying asylum is the information available at the time when the respective decision is made. 4.10 In the light of the information mentioned above, the State party refers to the conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights in Ashkan Panjeheighalehei v. Denmark,6 in which the Court stated that “the existence of the risk (of being subjected to 4 5 6 See communication No. 61/1996, X, Y and Z v. Sweden, Views adopted on 6 May 1998, para. 11.2. See communication No. 237/2003, M.C.M.V.F. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14 November 2005, para. 6.4. European Court of Human Rights, Ashkan Panjeheighalehei v. Denmark, decision as to the 5