CCPR/C/116/D/2402/2014 Annex IV Individual opinion of Committee members Sarah Cleveland and Fabián Omar Salvioli (dissenting) 1. We disagree with the Committee’s Views and write separately to object to the determination of inadmissibility in this case. 2. In Jasin et al. v. Denmarka and Ali et al. v. Denmark,b the Committee concluded that the authors’ removal to Italy with their young children on the basis of the initial decision of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board would violate article 7 of the Covenant. c In both cases, the Committee found that the State party had failed to devote sufficient analysis to the individual authors’ personal experience regarding the demonstrable failure of the Italian social service network and to the foreseeable consequences of forcibly returning them and their families to Italy. The Committee concluded that the State had failed to seek proper assurance from the Italian authorities that the authors and their minor children would be received in conditions compatible with their status as asylum seekers entitled to temporary protection and the guarantees under article 7.d 3. The State party properly acknowledges that the concept of protection includes certain social and economic elements, as asylum seekers must be treated in accordance with basic human standards. Like the authors in Jasin et al. v. Denmark and Ali et al. v. Denmark, the authors in the present case were granted subsidiary protection and residence permits, which legally entitled them to work and to various forms of social protection under Italian law. However, as in the above-mentioned cases, the authors soon found themselves destitute and living on the streets, with no assistance from the Italian authorities. As in the above-mentioned cases, the authors allege facts based on their personal experience, supported by reports regarding the conditions in Italian reception centres, indicating that there is a real risk that they and their two young children will be left similarly destitute and homeless if returned to Italy without assurances. Notably, as in Jasin et al., the second author in this case actually left Italy and was returned there, and after two months in a reception centre again was turned out onto the streets. As in Jasin et al., she thus was able to present specific evidence based on her own experience regarding the fate of persons who have previously been granted subsidiary protection by Italy and returned there. 4. The fact that in Jasin et al. the author’s residence permit had expired does not itself distinguish that case or that of Ali et al. from the circumstances here. Under Italian law the residence permit given to a person who is granted subsidiary protection, even if expired or lost, is renewable so long as the individual remains entitled to subsidiary protection. Indeed, in the present case, both authors’ residence permits were scheduled to expire in 2015, well before the Committee adopted its decision. 5. The Committee does not typically articulate the legal standard for finding a communication inadmissible for lack of substantiation. e However, the Committee has made clear that this form of admissibility requires the author to “submit sufficient evidence in a b c d e 16 Communication No. 2360/2014, Jasin et al. v. Denmark, Views adopted 22 July 2015. Communication No. 2409/2014, Ali et al. v. Denmark, Views adopted 29 March 2016. See Jasin et al. v. Denmark, para. 8.10, and Ali et al.v. Denmark, para. 7.9. See Jasin et al. v. Denmark, paras. 8.8-8.9, and Ali et al. v. Denmark, paras. 7.7-7.8. See article 2 of the Optional Protocol and rule 96 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure (indicating that the claim must be “sufficiently substantiated”). GE.16-10167