their behaviour and the ultimate wrong.117 Finally, for all forms of responsibility and modes of liability, the individual must have demonstrated criminal intent. The individual must intend to act, and to cause the harm, or at least to create a serious risk of foreseeable harm.118 Intent and recklessness provide the basis for the moral culpability and legal responsibility of the individual. States should carefully consider whether these basic principles are reflected in FTF-related laws and practice. First, in many incarnations of FTF-related laws, legislation detaches criminalized conduct from any appreciable harm or consequence in the external world. Many offences of travel, or “glorification” of terrorism, have a debatable or tangential link to future terrorist attacks, and are prosecuted on the basis that they may create a risk of such eventual attacks.119 Second, the critical dimension of intent is sometimes absent or limited in scope (directed not at the intent to commit terrorist acts but merely at the intent to travel to a conflict zone, to facilitate travel to a conflict zone for someone who intends to join a terrorist group or to receive terrorism training, or to provide funding in the knowledge that it could be used for terrorist ends).120 The link between an individual’s behavior and the criminal wrong becomes extremely tenuous when no specific conduct or contribution towards any act of terrorism, nor any intent to make such a contribution, is required for criminal charges to be levelled against the individual.121 In prosecuting FTF-related acts, states must ensure that the basic principle of individual responsibility is met, and that individuals are charged and punished based on their own conduct and culpability. Preventive prosecution (e.g., prior to travel) should, at a minimum, require proof of intent to carry out – or make a criminal contribution to – terrorist acts. In line with UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004), which contains guidance on the 117  A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, op. cit., note 105, p. 109. 118  For how this is reflected in international criminal law principles, see e.g., A. Eser, “Individual Criminal Responsibility”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), vol. 1, p. 797. 119  For example, in the United Kingdom crimes of “encouragement to terrorism” explicitly note that impact is irrelevant. Convictions include the cases against Tareena Shakil who tweeted support for ISIL and posted ISIL iconography; and Mohammed Moshin Ameen in which the accused was described by the court as risking “the emulation of terrorist actions” through opinions which inter alia “establish[ed] religious and social grounds for terrorist action”. In other cases the oath of allegiance, sharing of ideas and possession of information have been prosecuted. In some cases, judges have insisted on some direct connection to an act of terrorism. In cases from other participating States the ideas have not even been communicated: these include cases where leaflets were never distributed but still deemed “propagandizing”’ in Turkey; see: H. Duffy and K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”, op. cit., note 85. 120  According to UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) acts of support, organization or facilitation have to be “wilful” but (unlike for individuals who travel) do not have to have the purpose of participation in or support for terrorism, op. cit., note 1. 121  The risk of prosecution on charges of “material support” for providing training to promote respect for IHL or prosecution of individuals sending money abroad to their children for basic needs illustrates the decreasing regard for terrorist intent in the application of counter-terrorism legislation, see: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, op. cit., note 90; and cases involving family member prosecutions for terrorism financing in: B. Boutin, “Has Countering the Financing of Terrorism Gone Wrong? Prosecuting the Parents of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2 October 2017, <icct.nl/publication/ countering-the-financing-of-terrorism-gone-wrong-prosecuting-the-parents-of-foreign-terrorist-fighters/>. 38 Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”