As such, on the international level, the UN Working Group on mercenaries has noted the importance of distinguishing FTFs from participation in armed conflict, in accordance with IHL.82 This is reflected in the decision by some OSCE participating States to provide that exceptions for conduct that is permissible under IHL should be enshrined in FTF-related laws, or adopted in practice.83 Ensuring Safeguards for Legitimate Activity and Adequate Humanitarian Exceptions It follows from the breadth and scope of what has been described as the “FTF phenomenon” that far-reaching responses to it have thwarted or punished a range of legitimate activity. This problem is not limited to FTFs alone. Counter-terrorism laws on, for example, financing or providing “material support” to terrorist organizations,84 or the “indirect incitement” of terrorism,85 have increasingly been used against human rights defenders and humanitarian organizations in recent years. But due to the expanded prohibitions, restrictions and crimes that have emerged as a result of UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014), this problem has been exacerbated significantly.86 There are a range of related impacts, in particular on humanitarian actors, that arise from FTF measures, including: impeding their ability to engage with certain groups, and thereby to gain access to civilian populations in some areas; subjecting humanitarian personnel to new or heightened restrictions on travel that make their work practically impossible; or increasing intelligence-gathering activities in affected regions, which can undermine humanitarian actors’ relationships with local communities and partner organizations. For some governments, “the line between talking to proscribed groups for purposes of recruitment and talking to them for purposes of humanitarian negotiations 82  UN Working Group on mercenaries, UN Doc. A/70/330, op. cit., note 75. 83  At least two of the 57 OSCE participating States (Switzerland and Canada) appear to have such exclusions in certain laws. The Canadian Criminal Code defines “terrorist activity” under section 83.01(1) as expressly “not includ[ing] an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict [and which is] in accordance with… international law applicable to the conflict”. Article 260(4) of the Swiss Criminal Code provides that financing terrorism does not apply if “it is intended to support acts that do not violate the rules of international law on the conduct of armed conflicts”. There is no such exception for Swiss federal law proscribing participation in the activities of the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaida, however, as the law (unlike UNSC Resolution 2178) only applies to these groups. Reportedly, a number of legislative amendments are under consideration, creating new offences that do not appear to include humanitarian exceptions. 84  J. A. Fraterman, “Criminalising Humanitarian Relief: Are U.S. Material Support for Terrorism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law?”, International Law and Politics, 2014, pp. 401-402; K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, “Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), July 2013, pp. 20, 39-44. 85  For more detailed discussion and examples of issues arising from crimes of expression: H. Duffy and K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University, 4 April 2018, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156210> (hereafter, H. Duffy and K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”). 86  J. Burniske, D. A. Lewis, and N.K. Modirzadeh, “Suppressing Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action: A Provisional Framework for Analyzing State Practice”, October 2015, <https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673502>. 26 Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”